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South Africa is a biologically diverse but technologically less advanced economy.  
Like many other developing countries in the world, its biodiversity is exposed to 
danger due to certain human activities. Among these, patents are charged as the 
easiest routing for misappropriation of indigenous biological resources and traditional 
knowledge associated therewith. Being member of the United Nations Convention on 
Biodiversity, South Africa is under obligation to ensure that its patent system supports 
the Convention’s objectives including biodiversity conservation and sustainable use 
rather than its destruction and decline. The purpose of this dissertation is not only to 
dilute this misconception about South African patent system but to prove that with an 
access and benefit sharing mechanism it is an effective tool for biodiversity 
conservation, capacity-building and industrial development in the country. To make 
the system more protective of the rights of the indigenous communities, various 




A. RATIONALE BEHIND THE STUDY 
The real consideration behind granting patent is to protect and promote technological 
innovations. Though innovation may find its own way through granting exclusivity 
over a fixed period of time in exchange for a complete disclosure of the invention to 
the public, the patent system incentivizes entrepreneurs and researchers to invest into 
new ideas and technological innovations. For high-tech industries such as 
biotechnology and cell biology, where creation of the next generation of drugs 
requires years-long and unpredictably costly research and development (R&D), the 
need for an effective patenting system is enormous for the value of a company and its 
ability to raise finance. In parallel, innovations and patenting in pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries particularly demand greater genetic diversity.1 This among 
others requires maintenance of diverse traditional plant varieties, in the farmer’s field 
(in-situ).2  
Notwithstanding the fact that patents provide exclusive rights to researchers 
and innovators in exchange for disclosure of their inventions, the general public’s 
presumption is that it is destructive of the biological resources of the indigenous 
community.3 On the other hand, the practical experience reflects that, during the last 
two decades, growing of a relatively small number of high-yielding genetically 
uniform crop varieties for uniform food production4 has unknowingly exposed the 
traditional crop varieties and other genetic resources to greater risks of extinction.5 
This loss in diversity has greatly affected the availability of new drugs and treatments 
in the market.6 Added to the issue is the economic marginalization of the farmers or 
growers of diverse traditional plant varieties; consequent exodus of farmers to non-
farm employment; unfair acquisition of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
related thereto; inequitable sharing of benefit flowing from the utilization of 
                                                 
1 Louise Sperling ‘Using diversity: enhancing and maintaining genetic resources on-farm’ (1995), 
International Development Research Centre, CRDI, p130. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Carl-Gustaf Thornström ‘Access and Benefit Sharing: Understanding the Rules for Collection and 
Use of Biological Materials’ (2007), Handbook on Intellectual Property Management in Health and 
Agricultural Innovation, Vol. 2, PIPRA, p1461-67. 
4 ‘Biodiversity: Plants – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ available at 
http://www.fao.org/biodiversity/components/plants/en/  accessed on 4 January, 2017. 
5 H. F. Van Emden ‘Biodiversity and habitat modification in pest management’ (2011), International 
Journal of Tropical Insect Science, Vol. 15, Issue 6, p605-20. 
6 Christian Wolfe et al. ‘Human Genetic Diversity and the Threat to the Survivability of Human 
Populations’ available at https://www.ohio.edu/ethics/2003-conferences/human-genetic-diversity-and-
the-threat-to-the-survivability-of-human-populations/  accessed on 23 January, 2017. 
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biological resources; and the competitive disadvantage of the traditional crops 
compared to the modern genetically uniform varieties.7 
This thesis endeavors to explore the role of patents in conserving biodiversity 
especially the genetic resources and sustainable use of its components. While 
recognizing fair and equitable compensation for their stewards under the international 
conventions and agreements on biodiversity to which the South Africa is a member, 
this thesis probes factors contributing to the extinction of biodiversity, and suggests 
amendments to the existing South African Patents Act that may ensure greater 
protection to the South African biodiversity, traditional knowledge; and rights of the 
indigenous communities. 
  
                                                 
7 Stephen B. Brush ‘The Lighthouse and the Potato: Internalizing the Value of Crop Genetic Diversity’ 




CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to provide a conceptual understanding of the issue of biodiversity 
extinction and contributing factors from both the national and international 
perspectives. As far as the international perspective the concerned, the focus is on the 
key provisions of the most relevant international conventions and agreements. An 
important question is whether these provisions are indeed supportive of the 
instruments’ overarching objectives, or whether there are inconsistencies in some 
respects. Further, this chapter examines the impact of international agreements and 
conventions on national legislations and the role of national governments in 
biodiversity conservation.  
1.1  WHAT IS BIODIVERSITY AND WHY DO WE NEED TO CONSERVE IT? 
The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)8 defines ‘biodiversity’ to mean- ‘the 
variability among living organisms from all species, including inter alia, terrestrial, 
marine, and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are 
part: this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems’. This 
definition reflects that living things make up the biodiversity of the earth. It includes 
not only the naturally occurring species (the biological resources) ‘as such’ but also 
their functional unit of heredity (the genetic resources) and a dynamic complex of 
plants, animals, microbial or other origins containing functional unit of heredity.9  
It is well-accepted that biodiversity is critical for development and to maintain 
life-sustaining systems of biosphere, human well-being, the livelihood and cultural 
integrity of people10. A stable ecosystem is dependent on greater biodiversity.11 
Greater biodiversity increases the chances of discovering new compounds of 
increasing medicinal value12, diagnostic tools (new genes/DNA13 sequences), and 
methods of treatment. In the past, various species of plants and animals have proven 
to be useful for the treatment of various diseases. Examples include: Digitalin, 
                                                 
8 The United Nations Convention on Biodiversity, 1992.  
9 ‘Genetic resources and intellectual property’ World Intellectual Property Organization available at 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/genetic/ accessed on 12 April 2016. 
10 ‘Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
Arising out of their Utilization’ (2002), Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity,  p III. 
11 Edward Wilson ‘The Diversity of Life’ available at 
http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058170 accessed on 19 August, 2016.  
12David G.I. Kingston ‘Modern natural products drug discovery and its relevance to biodiversity 
conservation’ (2011) Journal of Natural Products Mar 25; 74(3): 496-511. 
13 DeoxyriboNucleic Acid. 
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isolated from the plant digitalis purpurea14 which was found to be useful for various 
cardiac conditions particularly for patients in atrial fibrillation; Vincristine isolated 
from rosy periwinkle15 of Madagascar which helps in treating childhood leukemia; 
Aloe ferox has long been known and used by South Africans as a purgative16; 
Aspalathuslinearis (commonly: Rooibos), growing in South Africa’s Fynbos, which 
has successfully been used in iron-deficiency anemia.17 
1.2  FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO BIODIVERSITY EXTINCTION   
In the preamble of the CBD, the contracting parties affirmed that 
‘conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of mankind’. Natural 
selection, as opposed to directed or designed selection, is the common process of 
evolution and variability within species to adapt to the environment. Loss in 
variability is directly equivalent to the extinction of species18. This has happened 
countless times in the earth’s history but with the increasing instances of human 
intervention in the natural selection process for enhanced productivity, the rate of 
extinction of species and variability has now increased to an alarming extent.19 More 
so, lack of information and knowledge about the significance of biodiversity and 
consequently the need for its conservation by developing countries that are rich in 
biological diversity20 has already destroyed many of the world’s strongest varieties of 
farm animals. Moreover, lack of resources to develop scientific, technical, and 
institutional capacities in developing countries has resulted in failure to assess future 
threats to biodiversity, and to plan and put into practice a course of action to conserve 
biodiversity.21 This situation22 has made it vital for the States23 to foresee, prevent, 
                                                 
14 (commonly: the foxgloves or ‘finger-like’ - native to western and southwestern Europe, western and 
central Asia, Australasia and Northwestern Africa). 
15 Raymond Cooper ‘Africa’s gift to the world’ available at http://www.rsc.org/eic/2015/12/rosy-
periwinkle-cancer-vinblastine accessed on 3 May 2016. 
16 Weiyang Chen ‘Cape aloes—A review of the phytochemistry, pharmacology and commercialisation 
of Aloe ferox’ (2012) El Sevier, Phytochemistry Letters 5 (2012) 1–12. 
17 Cecilia van Niekerk ‘Indigenous South African Medicinal Plants Part 11: Aspalathus linearis 
(‘Rooibos’)’ (2008) SA Pharmaceutical Journal – November/December. 
18 Anup Shah ‘Loss of Biodiversity and Extinctions’ available at 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/171/loss-of-biodiversity-and-extinctions accessed on 28 April 2016. 
19 Graham Bell ‘Adaptation, extinction and global change’ (2008) Evolutionary Applications, 1: 3–16. 
doi:10.1111/j.1752-4571.2007.00011.x. 
20 (such as Africa, Asia and South America). 
21 ‘Study on understanding the causes of biodiversity loss and the policy assessment framework’ 
European Commission Directorate-General for Environment, Report (2009), Framework Contract No. 
DG ENV/G.1/FRA/2006/0073 Specific Contract No. DG.ENV.G.1/FRA/2006/0073. 
22 i.e. Loss of variability, extinction of species, lack of awareness about loss of biodiversity, etc. 
23 i.e., signatories to the CBD and other conventions 
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and attach the causes of significant decrease or loss of biological resources at 
source.24 
Developing countries are the center of diversity and abundance of biological 
resources.25 This is why issues relating to the conservation of biodiversity, unfair 
acquisition, and inequitable sharing of benefits are more of concerns for the 
developing countries;26 and within them, for farmers and the stewards of these 
resources.  
1.3  BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION: THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
1.3.1 The CBD, 1992 
Based on the Charter of United Nations and the principles of international law, the 
CBD - adopted in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil - is the first instrument which 
provides a comprehensive framework to staunch the loss of biodiversity.27 
Recognizing the seriousness of threats to biodiversity, the CBD makes it incumbent 
upon the parties to the convention, to co-operate directly or through competent 
international organizations to meet the CBD’s objectives.28 For developed nations, 
this requires supporting biodiversity-rich but research and development lagging, 
economically poor countries in their efforts to conserve biodiversity29 and advance 
sustainable use.30 Within the meaning of the CBD, promoting biodiversity 
conservation, its sustainable-use, and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out 
of the use of genetic resources is thus a legally and morally binding obligation for the 
contracting states.31 Though not directly concerned with the patent standards, the 
CBD projects a new approach to deal with the issues relating to the conservation of 
                                                 
24 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992,  p 1. 
25 Klaus Ammann, ‘Reconciling Traditional Knowledge with Modern Agriculture: A Guide for 
Building Bridges’ (2007), Handbook on Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural 
Innovation, Vol. 2, PIPRA, p1552. 
26 Dennis S. Karjala ‘Biotechnology Patents and Indigenous Peoples’ (2007), Handbook on Intellectual 
Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation, Vol. 2, PIPRA, p1442. 
27 J. Spangenberg ‘Biodiversity Pressure and the Driving Forces Behind’ (2006) available at 
http://www.academia.edu/339491/Biodiversity_Pressure_and_the_Driving_Forces_Behind accessed 
on 23 January, 2017. 
28 Art. 5 of the CBD, 1992. 
29 Ademola A. Adenle et al.  ‘Stakeholder Visions for Biodiversity Conservation in 
Developing Countries’ (2015) available at www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/7/1/271/pdf accessed on 20 
January, 2017. 
30 ‘Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Biodiversity Synthesis’ available at 
www.unep.org/maweb/documents/document.354.aspx.pdf accessed on 18 January, 2017.  
31 Bonn Guidelines op cit note 10. 
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biological resources.32 It provided developing nations with an opportunity to record 
their protest concerning the unlawful exploitation of their indigenous resources and 
traditional knowledge. The CBD recognizes the states’ sovereignty over biological 
resources, and empowers them to regulate access to genetic resources.33 It further 
authorizes states to stipulate the terms and conditions of the Access and Benefit 
Sharing (ABS) mechanism including the sharing of the results of research and 
development fairly and equitably.34 The CBD provides that ownership over bio-
resources rests with the country of origin, regardless of whether the resources or 
knowledge related thereto merits protection under intellectual property laws.35 
Through recognizing national sovereignty over genetic resources, the CBD presaged a 
property system over them. The CBD thus represents a step towards a negotiated 
settlement between parties who manage genetic resources and are interested in their 
conservation. The CBD facilitates access to genetic resources on mutually agreed 
terms (MATs), subject to prior informed consent.36 Its key objectives have 
significantly impacted upon the way biological resources were exploited in the past. 
Bioprospecting contracts between pharmaceutical companies37 and indigenous 
communities in exchange for short- or long-term financial returns are a practical 
manifestation of the success of the CBD’s objectives, especially the ABS 
mechanism.38  
1.3.2  The Bonn Guidelines, 2002 
Through recognition of national governments’ autonomy over biological resources 
and helping access to them on MATs, the CBD has provided a general guideline for 
concluding bioprospecting contracts between the parties. However, it was only when 
the Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its 6th meeting, held in Hague in 
                                                 
32 Chapter 2 of the CBD, 1992. 
33 Art. 15.1 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992. 
34 Art. 15.7 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992. 
35 Achim Seiler et al.  ‘Regulating Access and Benefit Sharing: Basic issues, legal instruments, policy 
proposals’ (2001), German Federal Agency for Nature Conservation, BfN –Skripten 46, p93-100;  
Hanns Ullrich ‘Traditional knowledge, biodiversity, benefit-sharing and the patent system: Romantics 
v. Economics?’  (2005), EUI Working paper law No. 2005/07, p13; 
Carl-Gustaf Thornström ‘Science, Genetic Resources and Regulation’ (2014) available at 
http://www.slu.se/globalassets/.gamla_strukturen/externwebben/centrumbildningar-projekt/grip/grip-
12-13-science-genetic-resources-and-regulation-final-report-to-sida-.pdf accessed on 14 January, 
2017.  
36 Art. 15.4 & Art. 15.5 of the CBD, 1992. 
37 (either research-based or generics). 
38 Robert J. Lewis ‘Case studies on access and benefit-sharing’ (2006), The International Plant Genetic 
Resources Institute (IPGRI). 
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April, 2002 adopted the voluntary Bonn Guidelines, that the access and benefit-
sharing objective of the CBD could be operationalized. The Bonn Guidelines 
principally aimed at helping parties to develop an overall access and benefit-sharing 
policy, which may become part of their national biodiversity and action plan.39 And to 
advance this objective, it provides preliminary information about the rules on access 
to genetic resources and a concrete procedure to be followed by researchers, 
scientists, and pharmaceutical companies interested in bioprospecting.40 
Apart from the principal commonality with the CBD, the Bonn Guidelines 
have the following objectives: i) promotion of awareness on implementation of 
relevant provisions of the CBD; ii) provision of a transparent framework to make it 
easier the access to genetic resources and ensure fair-and-equitable sharing of 
benefits; iii) promotion of adequate and effective transfer of ‘appropriate’ technology 
to providing parties, and iv) capacity building to guarantee the effective negotiation 
and implementation of ABS arrangements.41 The Bonn Guidelines state legal 
certainty and minimization of transaction costs as pre-requisites for the development 
of MATs.42 The Guidelines also provide the following list of subjects43 to be agreed 
upon for the success of contractual agreements: i) type and quantity of genetic 
resources; ii) limitation on the use of material; iii) recognition of national sovereignty 
over genetic resources; iv) capacity-building; v) whether terms of agreement can be 
negotiated in certain circumstances; vi) whether genetic resources can be transferred 
to third parties and if so, under what conditions; vii) whether practices, knowledge, 
and innovations of indigenous communities are preserved, maintained and respected; 
viii) whether conventional use of biological resources is protected; ix) treatment of 
confidential information; and x) sharing of benefits (types, distribution, timing, and 
mechanism of benefits to be shared). 
  
                                                 
39 Bonn Guidelines op cit note 10. 
40 Klaus Liebig  et al. ‘Access to Genetic Resources and Approaches to Obtaining Benefits from their 
Use: the Case of the Philippines’ (2002), German Development Institute, Reports and Working Papers 
5/2002, p50-51; 
‘ABS-Management Tool Best Practice Standard and Handbook for Implementing Genetic Resource 
Access and Benefit-sharing Activities’ (2007), available at https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/abs_mt.pdf 
accessed on 4 January, 2017. 
41 Art. 11 of the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization, 2002. 
42 Art. 42 of the Bonn Guidelines, 2002. 
43 Art. 44-48 of the Bonn Guidelines, 2002. 
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1.3.3 TRIPS, 1994 
In order to further advance the CBD’s objectives, and to structure the terms and 
conditions in bioprospecting arrangements, in 1994, the United Nations member states 
concluded the WTO’s44 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). TRIPS provides minimum protection standards for IP. However, 
member states are at liberty to set higher standards for IPRs protection if they 
consider it appropriate. 
In literal terms, the CBD and TRIPS stand in conflict in that Art. 27(3)(b) of 
TRIPS on one hand permits its members states to exclude from patentability - ‘plants 
and animals other than micro-organisms and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants and animals other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes’; while on the other, it does mandate the plant varieties’ protection either by 
patents, or by an effective sui generis system, or a combination thereof. In contrast, 
the CBD does not favour patent protection to product when found in its natural 
environment.45 
The apparent conflict between TRIPS and the CBD is more of a nuisance than 
a real problem in that most of the concerns are imaginary. TRIPS clearly allows states 
to exclude naturally occurring plants (wild-type or landraces), including all varieties 
that are the results of natural selection process (crossing and selection), from 
patentability.46 It further authorizes member states to set an even higher standard of 
patentability resulting in exclusion of trivial inventions. Art. 27(2) of TRIPS permits 
member states ‘to exclude from patentability inventions the commercial exploitation 
of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality including to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment’.47 
Ordre public and morality have different meanings in different societies and cultures. 
Art. 27(1) of TRIPS allows protection to inventions that are new; are capable of 
industrial applications; and involve an inventive step. This means that traditionally 
developed or existing knowledge in the possession of local or indigenous community 
may not be the subject of patent protection.  
                                                 
44 The World Trade Organization, 1995. 
45 Paul Gepts ‘Who Owns Biodiversity, and How Should the Owners Be Compensated?’ (2004), Plant 
physiology, 134(4), p1295-1307. 
46 Art. 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS, 1994.  
47 Dan Leskien ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: Options for a Sui Generis 
System’ (1997), The International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI),  p 15. 
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1.3.4  The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 
2001 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA), adopted in Rome in 2001, is another international agreement governing 
agricultural biodiversity. The treaty states as its objectives, in harmony with the CBD, 
‘the conservation and sustainable use of all plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, 
for sustainable agriculture and food security’.48 It clarifies that these objectives will be 
achieved by closely linking the treaty to the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) of the United Nations and to the CBD.49 The treaty advocates promotion of an 
integrated approach towards exploration, collection, conservation, characterization, 
regeneration and evaluation, and documentation of plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture, however, in cooperation with other contracting parties and subject to 
national legislation.50 It also emphasizes further co-operation to promote development 
of an efficient and sustainable system of ex-situ (off-farm) conservation and 
development, and transfer of appropriate technologies for the purpose.51  
Art. 9 of the treaty is exclusively devoted to farmers’ rights: Art. 9.1 
recognizes ‘the enormous contribution of the local and indigenous communities and 
farmers of all regions of the world particularly those in the centers of origin and crop 
diversity’. In terms of Art. 9.2, responsibilities for realizing the farmer’s rights, as 
they relate to plant genetic resources for agriculture and food, rest with the national 
governments and this is made subject to national legislation. In particular, ‘the 
contracting parties are urged to take measures to protect and promote farmers’ rights, 
including: i) protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture; ii) the right to equitably participate in sharing benefits 
arising from the utilization of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; and iii) 
the right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to 
the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture’. Art. 9.3 expressly states that: ‘nothing in this Article [Art. 9] shall be 
interpreted to limit any rights that farmers have’.  
                                                 
48 Art. 1.1 of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 2001. 
49 Art. 1.2 of the ITPGRFA, 2001. 
50 Art. 5 of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 2001. 
51 Art. 5.1(e) of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 2001. 
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The treaty provides a multilateral system of access and benefit-sharing.52 It 
requires benefit-sharing53 through: ‘a) exchange of information; b) access to 
technology transfer; c) capacity building; and d) the sharing of monetary and other 
benefits of commercialization’.54 Subject to national legislation, the legally binding 
treaty recognizes the fundamental rights of farmers to save, use, sell, and/or exchange 
farm-saved seeds and other propagating materials.55  
Hence, the very aims and objectives of the treaty in unification with the CBD 
suggest that most of the concerns by NGOs and other non-profit organizations about 
exploitation of farmers’ rights need to be addressed by their respective governments. 
It is a failure on their own part when the national governments show connivance in 
making timely and appropriate legislation to protect their public rights and/or address 
their concerns.  
TRIPS, the CBD and the ITPGRFA are all legally binding instruments; so if 
they are in conflict with each other in any way, it is the responsibility of United 
Nations’ Office of the Secretariat to take measures to resolve any such controversies 
in cooperation with the contracting parties.56 Until their resolution, contracting parties 
must not be concerned about any outside threats. What the farmers, local and 
indigenous communities of the developing countries need to do is, not to let their 
respective governments make any conflicting provisions to be the part of their 
national legislation. Additionally they must focus on building capacity and 
infrastructure so that crop genetic resources and diversity may be protected and 
promoted. 
1.3.5  The Cartagena Protocol on biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2000  
The Cartagena Protocol57 is another instrument of great significance to meet the aims 
and objectives of the CBD.58 It provides rules on the biosafety and trans-boundary 
                                                 
52 Art. 10 of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 2001. 
53 Art. 13 of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 2001. 
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movements of genetically modified living organisms. Art. 2 of the Protocol requires 
its parties ‘to ensure that the development, handling, transport, use, transfer and 
release of any living modified organisms are undertaken in a manner that prevents or 
reduces the risks to biological diversity, taking also into account the risks to human 
health’. 
The Protocol explicitly states that it shall not have any affect or bearing on the 
sovereignty of the states over their biological resources.59 It further provides that - 
‘nothing in the protocol shall be interpreted as restricting the right of a party to take 
action that is more protective of the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity than that called for in the protocol’.60 Thus developing countries are at 
liberty to take legislative, administrative, and any other measures that are appropriate 
for the protection of their biological resources. In meeting the conservation and 
sustainable use objectives, developing countries can do more than the protocol called 
for. So once again, the concerns voiced by developing countries about exploitation of 
their rights are indicative of some ignorance concerning these provisions. Farmers, 
local and indigenous communities with the assistance of their scientists, researchers, 
and economist must urge their respective governments to take measures that are not 
only protective of the world biodiversity but also their own indigenous biological 
resources.61  
1.3.6  The Nagoya Protocol, 2010 
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (“Nagoya Protocol”) entered into force in 2014. It is another landmark 
treaty that significantly advances the CBD’s third objective (access and benefit 
sharing) by providing a strong base for transparency (for both providers and users of 
genetic resources) and greater legal certainty.62  
                                                                                                                                            
58 (i.e., conservation of biodiversity, sustainable-use of its components, and fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits arising out of the utilization of biological resources). 
59 Art. 2.3 of the Cartagena Protocol, 2000. 
60 Art. 2.4 of the Cartagena Protocol, 2000. 
61 Francesco Mauro ‘Traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities: International debate 
and policy initiatives’ (1999), Ecological Applications: Vol. 10, No. 5, pp. 1263–1269. 
62 María Julia Oliva ‘Sharing the Benefits of Biodiversity: A New International Protocol and its 
Implications for Research and Development’ (2011), Thieme Planta Medica, 77(11), p1221-27. 
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Among the various objectives, Nagoya protocol aims to promote the use of 
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. It also strengthens the 
opportunities for fair and equitable sharing of benefits. Stating differently, the Nagoya 
Protocol aims ‘to provide incentives to conserve biodiversity leading to sustainable 
development and human well-being’. The Protocol specifies means by which the 
CBD can be implemented. In order to address issues relating to fair-and-equitable 
sharing of benefits derived in trans-boundary situations and where the possibility to 
grant or obtain prior informed consent is not an option, Nagoya Protocol provides a 
global working mechanism.63 
The Protocol defines its relationship with other international agreements and 
instruments.64 It provides that- ‘this Protocol shall not affect the rights and obligations 
of any party deriving from any existing international agreement, except where the 
exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to 
biological diversity’.65 It further allows states to join any other relevant international 
agreements.66 This suggests parties may refuse to implement conflicting provision in 
other international agreements that are in conflict with the CBD’s and the Nagoya 
Protocol’s objectives.67 And if this rule is to prevail then any provision of TRIPS 
working against the CBD’s objectives may be held responsible.  
1.3.7 UPOV, 1991 
The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants Convention68 
(UPOV) provides legal protection for plant varieties fulfilling the new, distinct, 
uniform, and stable (NDUS) criteria. One of the key objectives of the UPOV is to 
ensure that ‘the members of the UPOV acknowledge the achievement of breeders of 
new varieties of plants, by granting them an intellectual property right, on the basis of 
a set of clearly defined principles’.69 
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The UPOV Convention contains exceptions70 to infringements so that the 
breeders of a variety cannot prevent others from the following activities: ‘i) acts done 
privately for non-commercial purposes; ii) acts done for experimental purposes; iii) 
acts done for the purpose of breeding other varieties’. Moreover, farmers are free to 
use the farm-saved seeds for re-propagation on their own land.71 Another salient 
feature of the 1991 revision of the UPOV Convention is that protection to NDUS 
varieties now extends to ‘essentially derived varieties’ (EDVs).72  
There is general presumption that by requiring parties to protect plant varieties 
through patent or by a sui generis system, TRIPS threatens crop biodiversity; 
undermines the CBD’s objectives; and usurps the rights of the plants growers and/or 
their stewards.73 Ironically these are the issues connected with the nations’ status. 
Until the developing nations attain the status of developed, these issues shall keep on 
sprouting in one way or the other.  The TRIPS provides states with this flexibility; 
national governments face an array of options in choosing the intellectual property 
regime applicable to plant varieties.74 An act of national PVP legislation, complying 
with the UPOV Convention is one of them. Understanding of the reality and 
implications of the UPOV regulations for farmers in developing countries could 
inform decision-making and contribute to designing national PVP laws that take the 
particular situation of these countries into account. 
 
This chapter concludes that irrespective of apparent conflictions in some 
international conventions and agreements, these unanimously urge the need of 
conserving biological diversity for evolution; and direct states to use their biological 
resources in a sustainable manner. Based on these findings, the next chapter focuses 
on how to protect the biological diversity from piracy and the role of intellectual 
property laws in achieving this objective. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BIOPIRACY AND IP 
Whatever the nature of factors fueling the issue of biopiracy, its impact on the 
national economy and biodiversity conservation strategies is devastating.75 In the first 
part of this chapter, beyond defining the concept of biopiracy and its implication on 
biodiversity, a significant number of landmark cases concerning biopiracy are 
discussed. In the second part, different IP mechanisms available to companies to 
protect the results of their investments in bioprospecting are examined.  With specific 
reference to patents, this chapter endeavors to critically examine existing conceptions 
about the scope of protection provided to the innovations based on IBRs. 
2.1 WHAT IS BIOPIRACY? 
Protecting TK and IBRs such as plants, microbes, and genetic materials (commonly: 
the biodiversity) from unlawful misappropriation is one of the challenges faced by 
developing countries, and South Africa is no exception.76 Conservation of biodiversity 
is critical to thwart unlawful exploitation of indigenous people’s rights, and to ensure 
that patent rights are not granted for products and treatments lying in the public 
domain. In parallel, it is another reality that exponential growth of intellectual assets 
requires that the pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies are allowed access to 
biological resources of the developing countries for the development of new 
pharmaceutical and agricultural products. 
Unfair exploitation of indigenous people’s knowledge with regards to the 
medicinal qualities of plants and other biological resources by research-based 
companies, without prior permission from, and with little or no compensation or 
recognition to the indigenous people, is a practice commonly termed as ‘biopiracy’.77 
Stated differently, biopiracy is a depressing consequence of a practice called 
‘bioprospecting’ involving: i) use of indigenous people’s knowledge to identify the 
local plants, previously known for their curative value, which are then synthetically 
                                                 
75 Hanspeter Rejhling ‘Bioprospecting the African Renaissance: The new value of muthi in South 
Africa’ (2008), Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine, http://doi.org/10.1186/1746-4269-4-9; 
Deborah Andrews ‘Traditional Agriculture, Biopiracy and Indigenous Rights’ (2012) available at 
https://sciforum.net/conference/wsf2/paper/928/download/pdf accessed on 11 January, 2017. 
76 Charles McManis ‘Trends and scenarios in the legal protection of traditional knowledge’ (2011), 
Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors, ch. 4. 
77 James Otieno Odek ‘The Kenya Patent Law: Promoting Local Inventiveness or Protecting Foreign 
Patentees?’ (1994) Journal of African Law 38. 
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reproduced; ii) the use of TK or IBRs as a precursor for producing valuable products 
such as biopharmaceuticals; iii) the discovery and isolation of previously unknown 
compounds from the IBRs for the development of new drugs and other valuable 
products and/or iv) the use of traditional medicines as an escort to screen plants and 
other biological resources for the discovery of medicinally active new compounds.78  
2.1.1  Examples of biopiracy 
  Turmeric (commonly: ‘Haldi’) is the most hotly debated case of biopiracy. 
Since olden times, turmeric has been used in India and Pakistan for wound healing. In 
1995, two Indian scientists Suman K. Das and Hari Har P. Cohly obtained a use-
bound US patent79 specifically covering use of turmeric for external wound treatment. 
The patent was challenged by the Indian Government on account of anticipation and 
consequently the United States Patent and Trade Mark Office (USPTO), upon receipt 
of a compelling case for novelty destroying prior art, revoked the patent.80 
  Neem tree (Azadirachta Indica) is a traditional plant of Pakistan, India and 
Nepal renowned for its medicinal and insecticidal activities. In early 1990s, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture and W.R. Grace Chemical Company in the U.S. obtained a 
patent81 with a principal claim for a ‘method for controlling fungi on plants by the aid 
of hydrophobic extracted Neem oil’. The company, jointly with P.J. Margo Pvt. Ltd. 
of India, set up a plant in India for processing Neem seeds. In 2000, the patent was 
successfully opposed by several groups from the EU and India including the European 
Union Green Party, Vandana Shiva, and the International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movement (IFOAM), on the basis that the fungicidal activity of Neem-
extract had long been known in Indian traditional medicine.82 The appeal was lost in 
2005.83  
  Basmati cultivated in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India is a variety of rice 
unique in taste, aroma and grain’s length. Ricetec Inc. of USA developed a new plant 
                                                 
78 Naeema Sadaf  ‘Bio-prospecting: Pakistan patent law treats contribution of indigenous knowledge 
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World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3205.  
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Biotechnology 23(5):511-12. 
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variety by crossing American long grain rice and Basmati rice, and obtained a patent84 
for it in the U.S. The Government of India challenged the patent and all specific ‘per 
se’ claim to genetic lines of basmati were ultimately withdrawn.85  
  Hoodia, a succulent South African plant, found in Kalahari Desert, was long 
known to the San people as an appetite suppressant. The South African Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), in 1996, began working with 
pharmaceutical companies to develop a dietary supplement based on Hoodia.86 
Initially, the San people were not included to reap the benefits of use and 
commercialization of their traditional knowledge, but in 2003 the South African San 
Council came to an agreement with the CSIR under which they would receive 
between 6 and 8% of the revenue from the sale of Hoodia products.87 Interestingly, in 
2008, after having invested more than 20 million euro in R&D to know if Hoodia can 
be a potential ingredient in dietary supplement for weight loss, Unilever88 terminated 
the project as the results of their clinical trials did not favor Hoodia as a  safe and 
effective marketable product.89 
A continuing reflection of biopiracy may be seen in the ongoing Bt Brinjal90 
case between U.S. company Monsanto and the Environmental Support Group (ESG), 
India; and Monsanto’s patent91 covering, inter alia, conventionally bred plants such as 
Indian-melons.92 
2.2  IMPLICATIONS OF BIOPIRACY: 
Adverse implications of biopiracy may be seen when pharmaceutical companies 
attempt to monopolize, through patenting, traditional medicines and practices by 
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reproducing them synthetically. When enforcing such patents, indigenous people may 
be deprived of their right to practice traditional knowledge or to use IBRs in 
traditional ways.93 Critics claim that these practices of pharmaceutical companies 
contribute to the economic disparity between developing countries rich in 
biodiversity, and developed countries hosting companies that engage in 'biopiracy'.94 
This criticism poses two basic questions: i) Whether it is justified to give access to the 
genetic resources and TK associated with them to the companies from the developed 
world (and if so, to what extent); and ii) what are the circumstances under which it is 
fair and equitable to share the benefits arising from utilizing these resources between 
the pharmaceutical company and the IBRs holder.  
In order to find answers to these questions, the following should be 
considered: 
From an economic perspective, information or knowledge, which is already in 
the public domain, is less attractive in that it has low momentum to accelerate the 
existing market. On the other hand, patents on naturally occurring substances, even in 
isolated or purified form, are not available for want of non-obviousness.95 Thus, what 
is left to the innovator companies is either to modify the activity of the original 
resource product (for instance, by using some new processes or schemes or 
intermediary agents) or discover new resources for isolation of new active ingredients 
having potential for medicinal or non-medicinal activities to secure some form of 
patent protection. While considering bioprospecting options, research-based 
companies are generally aware of the fact that the scope of patent protection to any 
invention involving the use of IBRs cannot extend to the original resource product.96 
So the critics’ allegation of economic disparity between the developed and developing 
nations over use of IBRs as part of bioprospecting is imaginary.97 Patents as such do 
not allow bioprospectors to exploit the indigenous communities. A parallel reality is 
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that the patent law has no provision to regulate any such attempts. The foregoing 
supports the view that giving access over IBRs to research-based companies for 
developing improved products or searching new bio-actives is also in the interest of 
indigenous communities both from an economic and a health perspective. However, 
for economically poor territories, an associated adverse impact of patents on 
economic activity in the form of increase in the price of access shall continue to exist.  
When considering the circumstances justifying the sharing of benefits arising 
from the utilization of IBRs, the deciding factor is the contribution made by the 
indigenous community. For instance, if the contribution is to merely give access to the 
resources, or supply information or knowledge relating to the medicinal properties or 
therapeutic values of the local plants/herbs, or identification of starting material, such 
contribution does usually not justify creating joint-ownership rights for the indigenous 
community over any patentable innovation that is made using IBRs. In other words, it 
depends on the nature of the indigenous community’s contribution (i.e., inventive or 
non-inventive contributions) whether and to what extent it is fair to share the benefits 
arising from the utilization of IBRs with the holders of the IBRs or TK.   
Another implication of biopiracy is the depletion of physical resources (e.g., 
plants, animals, soils nutrients) of the source country.98 This allegation is, however, 
not considered a problem associated with intellectual property. If an active ingredient 
is isolated from a medicinally active plant and synthetically manufactured, there is no 
further contribution to depletion in the source country. On the other hand, if the 
source country grants a patent on the isolated compound, the patentee can prevent 
others from using the plant for the purpose of isolating the active component and thus 
may add something to control depletion. 
Seen in the above light, having access to genetic resources for the sake of 
commercialization or for conserving biodiversity and promoting its sustainable use 
are two different issues and must be assessed differently.  
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2.3 PROTECTING BIODIVERSITY: THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
IBRs and the TK associated therewith are considered as subjects of ‘collective’ 
ownership. Passed down from generation to generation and developed through 
specific culture, tradition, need, and lifestyle in communities, these resources and 
knowledge- especially the knowledge related to the specific uses of plants for 
medicinal purposes – require adequate protection from exploitation particularly by the 
developed economies.99 In the early 20th century, a shift to non-traditional sources for 
medicine had substantially declined the significance of ethnobotany in drug-discovery 
programs100 but the discovery of anticancer and antiviral agents from plants (such as 
turmeric and Neem), have revived the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries’ 
interest towards screening of IBRs and traditional practices, and in parallel increased 
the need for their protection under the appropriate IP laws.    
From another perspective, non-availability of funds and lack of efficient 
means of States to incentivize and mandate farmers to grow traditional plant varieties 
has tilted the balance of strategies for reducing the externality of genetic erosion 
towards privatization and bioprospecting.101 Under this approach, farmers and local 
communities can negotiate with their users (the seed and pharmaceutical companies) 
as a logical and practical solution for conservation of biodiversity and sustainable-use 
of its components. Such contracts may be in exchange for monetary benefits (such as 
access fee for collecting samples; payment of royalties in case the use of biological 
sample or TK has resulted into a novel or improved patentable technology; and joint-
ownership of relevant IPRs) or long-term non-monetary benefits (such as sharing of 
R&D results; collaboration in scientific research and development programs 
particularly biotechnological activities; access to ex-situ facilities of databases and 
genetic resources).102 An effective IP protection system is, therefore, the ‘must’ 
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requirement of the companies thinking of investing in bioprospecting contracts to 
protect the results of their investments as well as to conserve biodiversity.103 In 
contrast to the pre-TRIPS situation, a number of different IP mechanisms is now 
available to protect new and/or improved medicinal products and plant varieties in the 
forms of, e.g., patents; plant variety protection (PVP) / plant breeders’ rights (PBR); 
utility patents; trade secrets; and geographical indications. These are discussed below.  
2.3.1 Patents: 
A patent concerns with an invention that is novel, industrially useful, non-obvious, 
and expressed in a way that can be followed by others.104 A patent establishes 
exclusive rights to certain dealings (such as use, production, and sale) with the 
invention. One of the pre-requisites for patentability is novelty. This means that an 
invention that is already known to the public at the patent filing date cannot be 
patented because it is not ‘new’. This principle is now contained in Art. 27(1) of the 
TRIPS agreement which states that: ‘--- patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.’ 
As a result of the rule of worldwide novelty, it is less likely that biodiversity 
rich countries shall grant intellectual property rights over knowledge that is widely 
spread amongst communities.105 And companies/researchers cannot hold product 
patents on naturally occurring substances of known utility even if they isolate or 
purify and transform them into commercially viable products,106 such as- 
i) quinine, isolated from Neem (Azadirachta Indica) for treating fever or for 
use as insecticide; 
ii) Foeniculoside I isolated from Saunf (Foeniculum Vulgare) for the 
regulation of menstruation, as carminative, insect repellant etc.; 
iii) Aspirin derived from a traditional Arab plant for treating fever and 
headache; 
iv) Artimisinin isolated from Qing Hao (China) for treating malaria; 
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v) solanum  indicum (‘Mulli’) for treating  asthma, dry cough; and chronic 
febrile affection; 
vi) Nigella sativa (Kalonji) for use as an antioxidant and antimicrobial agent; 
vii) Lipoxygenase I (LOX-I) protein isolated from Barley plant for use in the 
manufacture of a beverage.  
However, ever since the US Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in the Chakrabarty 
case,107 isolated cells, and genes/ DNA sequences, resulting in the creation of the new 
and/or improved medicinal products, and plant varieties have been the subject of 
patent grants. Nonetheless, the scope of this protection did not extend to the original 
native or resource product. The pre-patent product continued to be available, for 
instance, to the local community for use in their own traditional way. It is against this 
background that it is argued here that the general public’s presumption that patents 
work against or contribute to the destruction of biodiversity108 is unfounded. Patents 
provide incentives for investment into new ideas or technological innovations and, at 
least in the pharmaceutical and agriculture sectors, this is not possible unless there is 
greater genetic diversity.109 Conservation and sustainable-use of biodiversity is, 
therefore, in the interest of pharmaceutical and seed companies from the developed 
world. Thus contrary to the general presumption, patents are critical for conserving 
genetic resources and the real challenge appears to be the safeguarding of fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits in the form of royalty sharing. Bioprospecting contracts 
provide a simple and direct way of implementing the CBD objectives with resulting 
patents contributing to the calculation of price-of-access.110 
By now, many biodiversity-rich countries111 are bound by the Paris 
Convention,112 WTO’s TRIPS agreement, the PCT113, and/or the UPOV. 
Consequently, most developing countries now provide patent protection to all 
technologies including biotechnology.  
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2.3.2 Plant Variety Protection / Plant Breeders’ Rights: 
Many countries, including South Africa, have adopted plant variety 
protection (PVP) mechanisms for two reasons: i) to fulfill their 
obligation under Art. 27(3)114 of the TRIPS agreement, and ii) to protect the rights of 
breeders of sexually reproducing plant varieties.115 The very objective 
behind granting PVP certificates is to provide economic incentives for breeders to 
continue breeding new plant varieties. This may be substantiated from the fact that 
TRIPS has allowed member states to exclude from patentability animals, plants and 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals. Only 
microbiological and non-biological processes can be the subjects of patent grants.116  
Therefore, contrary to the presumptions by local or indigenous communities, 
backed by some NGOs and other non-profit organizations, naturally occurring 
animals, plants, and essentially biological processes (such as crossing and selection) 
for their production are freely available to the public for traditional use or practices 
even if an agricultural or pharmaceutical company has secured patent rights over the 
gene or DNA sequence isolated from the naturally occurring plant for use in some 
innovative process or technology.117 
Across all countries that offer PVP certificate, the protection standard is 
uniform. The variety must meet NDUS criteria i.e. newness; distinctness from 
existing commonly known varieties; uniformity, and stability. Principally and 
logically the protection criteria set out under the UPOV is supportive to meet the 
objectives of the CBD. Search for novel, distinct, uniform and stable varieties is the 
key to conservation and sustainability of biodiversity.  
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non-biological and microbiological processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection of 
plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. 
The provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement’. 
115 Kenneth Sibley, ‘The law and strategy of biotechnology patents: Biotechnology Series’ (1994), 
Butterworth-Heinemann, ch-11. 
116 Lionel Bently, Brad Sherman ‘Intellectual Property Law’ (2014), Oxford University Press, p499. 
117  Adam Andrzejewski ‘Traditional knowledge and patent protection: conflicting views on 
international patent standards’ (2010), PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 13(4), 94-125. 
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2.3.3 Utility Patents: 
Utility models/patents provide protection similar to patents but with a relatively low 
threshold of inventiveness118 and a shorter protection term, usually between seven and 
ten years.119 Novelty still remains to be a ‘must’ requirement.120 So far TRIPS has not 
recognized utility patents as a minimum standard for IP protection121 but being an 
appropriate channel for TK protection, this is getting increased significance in many 
WTO member states. Because of the low thresholds of novelty and inventiveness, 
utility patents appear to be more suitable to protect indigenous claims to traditional 
herbal medicines as one can see in the Kenyan legislation.122 In the USA, a new plant 
variety whether produced sexually or asexually may be claimed in a utility patent by 
simply reciting the variety’s designation. Plants products such as plant genes, gene 
transfer vector, and processes for producing transgenic plants may also be protected 
under utility patents.123 
2.3.4 Trade Secrets: 
A trade secret is a type of intellectual property.124 It is defined as ‘any formula, 
pattern, device, or compilation of information that is used in someone’s business and 
gives him/her an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not 
know or use it’.125 Under this mechanism, a wide range of products (such as cell lines, 
plasmids, vectors, isolated purified protein and biological materials), patentable 
subject matter, and non-patentable ‘know-how’ can be protected.126 Traditional 
knowledge relating to the medicinal value of a plant or other genetic resources, which 
                                                 
118 Kadidal S. ‘Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and the Neem Patent 
Controversy’ (1997), IDEA: The Journal of Law and Technology. p371–403. 
119 WIPO ‘Protecting Innovations by Utility Models’ available at 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/utility_models.htm accessed on 11 July, 2016.  
120 WIPO ‘Protecting Innovations by Utility Models’ available at 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/utility_models.htm accessed on 12 July, 2016. 
121 ‘Advice on Flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement’ World Intellectual Property Organization 
available at http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/legislative_assistance/advice_trips.html accessed 
on 21 August, 2016. 
122 Stephen A. Hansen et al ‘Issues and Options for Traditional Knowledge Holders in Protecting Their 
Intellectual Property’ (2007), Handbook on Intellectual Property Management in Health and 
Agricultural Innovation, Vol. 2, PIPRA, p1525. 
123 Kenneth Sibley, ‘The law and strategy of biotechnology patents: Biotechnology Series’ (1994), 
Butterworth-Heinemann, p178-179. 
124 ‘Trade Secret Policy’ USPTO, available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-
started/international-protection/trade-secret-policy accessed on 13 February, 2017. 
125 Restatement of Torts Section 757, Comment b, available at 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/40/part-350/subpart-A/appendix-A accessed on 11 August, 2016.  




is of commercial significance and is maintained within a group of people or 
community can be considered a trade secret and be protected as such.127 However, 
once the information or material has lost confidentiality, it no longer is a trade 
secret.128 Generally, indigenous people or communities have the culture of 
exchanging information and biological resources freely and as such for them to 
maintain secrecy is often difficult.129 This is why despite its enormous significance in 
terms of value, unlimited duration, and capability of protection worldwide with little 
expense, trade secrets have proved to be less effective in protecting traditional 
knowledge;130 except where the disclosure is the result of breach of confidence and 
other acts contrary to honest business practices, trade secrets have no legal protection. 
Conditions for protection of trade secrets vary from country to country, but Art. 39 of 
TRIPS has introduced some general standards for consideration. According to Article 
39.2- ‘Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information 
lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others 
without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long as 
such information: 
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration 
and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily 
accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of 
information in question; 
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and 
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the 
person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret’. 
2.3.5 Geographical Indications: 
When a given quality, reputation, or characteristic of a good is associated with a 
specific geographical origin, territory, or locality,131 geographical indications (GI) 
                                                 
127 ‘Intellectual Property and Traditional medical knowledge’ WIPO Publication available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/background_briefs-e-n6-web.pdf accessed 
on 19 July, 2016.  
128 Gene Quinn ‘Protecting a Trade Secret: Taking Precautions to Preserve Secrecy’ available at 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/04/16/trade-secret-preserve-secrecy/id=68168/ accessed on 10 May, 
2016.  
129 Molly Torsen et al. ‘Intellectual Property and the Safeguarding of Traditional Cultures’ (2010), 
WIPO, p21. 
130 Silke von Lewinski ‘Indigenous Heritage and Intellectual Property: Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge, and Folklore’ (2004), Kluwer Law International, p135. 
131 Art. 22 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994. 
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protection comes into play. Examples include: Rooibos (South Africa); Roque fort 
Cheese (France), Swiss watches (Switzerland), Basmati rice (Pakistan, India, 
Bangladesh), Darjeeling tea (India), Maca (Andean), and Jasmine tea (Pakistan). Art. 
22 of the TRIPS provide that to avoid misleading the public and to prevent unfair 
competition, geographical indications must be protected. Article 23 provides 
additional protection for wines and spirits. By using GI protection, indigenous people 
may promote their specific quality products with a distinguishing name, word, shape, 
or device. While the scope and approaches to protection of GIs varies from state to 
state, the principal objective behind this form of  protection is to serve the purposes of 
an identifier of the source or origin of the product; an indicator of the product; a 
promoter of the product with a distinctive name; and a provider of the statutory rights 
of defense against infringement and unfair competition for using a location as a name 
for similar products, GIs protect the quality and character associated with the origin of 
that product. Through creating digital databases or other publicly accessible libraries 
or registries, preemptive protection of GIs can be generated.132 
Protection through certification trademarks is another option available to 
indigenous people to protect their IBRs and TK associated therewith.133 For instance, 
Aspalathus linearis (commonly: Rooibos) native to the high Fynbos of South Africa is 
known globally for its medicinal characteristics, quality and taste. A certification 
mark may officially be registered for South African Rooibos. Any other body or 
concern outside South Africa, using the same name for the product they grow in the 
plain fields of their country, shall be considered as violation of the rights conferred by 
GI or the trade mark laws of the South Africa.134 
Concluding Remarks: 
This chapter concludes that where IP recognizes the intellect of the researchers and 
scientists working in complex sciences (biotechnology, molecular and cell biology) 
through grant of exclusivity for a certain period of time, it simultaneously takes care 
of the interests and creations of the local or indigenous communities, including 
farmers, holding the TK and practices. Stating it differently, the key discussion in this 
area is whether the laws take sufficient care of these interests or not. What is desirable 
                                                 
132 Ibid. 
133 ‘Fact Sheets - Geographical Indications’ (2015), International Trade Association. 
134 Sec. 42 of the South African Trade Marks Act, 1993 (Act No. 194 of 1993). 
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is to create awareness amongst the indigenous communities about their rights and 




CHAPTER THREE: SOUTH AFRICA’S BIOPROSPECTING AND 
BIODIVERSITY ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING MECHANISMS 
This chapter focuses on the need for bio-prospecting collaborations and their 
significance in the conservation of South Africa’s biodiversity. It discusses the role of 
international agreements (such as the CBD, the Bonn Guideline, and the Nagoya 
Protocol) to which South Africa is a party, in shaping the specific terms and 
conditions of the agreements on access, material collection and transfer on mutually 
agreed terms, and benefit-sharing where South African bioresources are involved. It 
further considers whether the South African biodiversity laws and regulations are in 
harmony with the various international legal frameworks. It also addresses issues 
relating to ownership over the resulting IP and distribution of funds generated from 
the utilization of IBRs and associated TK fairly and equitably. 
3.1  WHAT IS BIOPROSPECTING? 
Sec. 2 of the NEMBA defines the term ‘bioprospecting’ in relation to the IBRs to 
mean-  
‘any research on, or development or application of, indigenous 
biological resources for commercial or industrial exploitation, 
and includes- 
(a) the systematic search, collection or gathering of such 
resources or making extraction from such resources for 
purposes of such research, development or application ; 
(b) the utilization for purposes of such research or development 
of any information regarding any traditional uses of indigenous 
biological resources by indigenous communities; or  
(c) research on, or the application, development or 
modification of, any such uses, for commercial or industrial 
exploitation’.  
According to this definition, bioprospecting activities include:    
i)  Use of indigenous people’s knowledge to identify the local plants, previously 
known for their curative value, and to isolate the active compounds which are 
then synthetically reproduced;  
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ii)  Use of IBRs or TK as a precursor for producing valuable products such as 
biopharmaceuticals;  
iii)  Use of traditional medicines as an escort to screen plants and other biological 
resources for the discovery of medicinally active new compounds;135 
iv) Discovery and isolation of previously unknown compounds from the IBRs 
(plants, animals, microbes, and other genetic materials) for the development 
of new drugs and other valuable products;136 and/or  
v) Use of IBRs and TK to bring development and/or modification in the already 
existing products, processes, and practices.137 
3.2   BIOPROSPECTING COLLABORATIONS  
Misappropriation of IBRs and TK is one of the biggest challenges faced by the 
science and technology lagging economies.138 On the one hand, industrial 
development and exponential growth of intellectual assets in developing countries 
demands allowing access to bioresources and associated knowledge to the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies; while on the other, conservation of 
biodiversity to thwart piracy of bioresources and assurance that patents shall not be 
granted for products and treatments already lying in the public domain,139 is critical 
for sustainable development. 
Harboring a majority of the earth’s species, South Africa falls among the 
group of megadiverse countries.140 Owing to the enormous potential for drugs 
discovery from genetic resources, South Africa is a country of significant interest to 
bioprospectors. In 2008, in discharge of its obligations under CBD, South Africa 
regulated bioprospecting ABS mechanisms, which are now principally in line with the 
Nagoya protocol on access to genetic resources and equitable sharing of benefits 
                                                 
135 S Sasidharan ‘Extraction, Isolation and Characterization of Bioactive Compounds from Plants' 
Extracts’ (2011), Afr J Tradit Complement Altern Med. 8(1):1-10. 
136 Gordon M. Cragg ‘Natural Products: A Continuing Source Of Novel Drug Leads’ (2013), 
Biochimica et biophysica acta 1830.6: p3670–3695. 
137 Ibid. 
138 ‘Traditional Knowledge & Biopiracy: The Peruvian Maca Root’ (2011), Public Interest Intellectual 
Property Advisors, Inc., Peru. 
139Paul Gepts ‘Who Owns Biodiversity, and How Should the Owners Be Compensated?’ (2004), Plant 
Physiology, 134(4), 1295–1307. http://doi.org/10.1104/pp.103.038885. 
140 Neil R. Crouch ‘South Africa’s bioprospecting, access and benefit-sharing legislation: current 
realities, future complications, and a proposed alternative’ (2008), South African Journal of Science, 
No. 104, p355-365. 
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arising from their utilization to the CBD.141 Bioprospecting collaborations between 
pharmaceutical or seed companies and the local or indigenous communities for the 
discovery and development of new plant varieties, drugs and treatments may be 
assessed as one of the various mechanisms envisaged to conserve South African 
biodiversity; promote technological innovations; and to ensure sharing of economic 
benefits through formalized means.142 Notwithstanding the fact that States must be 
responsible to take measures incentivizing farmers and farming communities143 to 
continue planting traditional plant varieties and carrying traditional breeding 
practices, States generally have no such incentives and means to mandate farmers to 
do so.144 Moreover, South Africa’s agricultural development policies requiring 
replacement of genetically modified or improved varieties with the local plant 
varieties to increase food production, farm income, and food availability seem 
unsuited to reduce the negative externality of genetic erosion.145 This is for the reason 
that genetically modified varieties produce uniform food products but in parallel 
reduce genetic-diversity and decrease shelf-life. Under these circumstances, 
bioprospecting contracts between the producers146 and users147 of IBRs, genetic 
resources and TK relating thereto seem to offer a logical solution of the issues 
involving access to these resources, and fair-and-equitable sharing of benefits derived 
from such access.148  
In line with the laws and practices prevalent in other CBD member states, 
South Africa’s Biodiversity Act and BABS regulations made thereunder provide an 
opportunity for indigenous communities to give access to their genetic resources and 
associated knowledge to research-based companies for screening and discovering a 
                                                 
141 Freedom-Kai Phillips ‘sustainable bio-based supply chains in light of the Nagoya Protocol’ 
available at https://www.academia.edu/31086435/Sustainable_bio-
based_supply_chains_in_light_of_the_Nagoya_Protocol accessed on 24 February, 2017.  
142 ‘Biodiversity & Human Well-being’ GreenFacts available at 
http://www.greenfacts.org/en/biodiversity/l-3/6-conserve-biodiversity.htm accessed on 23 August, 
2016. 
143 Nick Hanley ‘How should we incentivize private landowners to ‘produce’ more biodiversity?’ 
(2012), Oxf Rev Econ Policy,  28 (1):93-113.doi: 10.1093/oxrep/grs002.  
144 Stephen B. Brush ‘The Lighthouse and the Potato: Internalizing the Value of Crop Genetic 
Diversity’ (2002), Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), Working paper No. 37, University of 
Massachusetts. 
145 Stephen B. Brush op cit note 7.  
146 (farmers, landowners, stewards, and local or indigenous communities). 
147 (pharmaceutical or seed companies). 
148 ‘Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future’ UN 
Documents: Gathering a Body of Global Agreements available at http://www.un-documents.net/wced-
ocf.htm accessed on 29 July, 2016. 
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potentially marketable bioactive.149 Depending on their contribution in the screening 
and drug discovery program, rights to any ensuing patents may be determined for the 
assessment of benefit-sharing and allocation of funds for the conservation of 
biodiversity. The bioprospecting contracts signed between Shaman Pharmaceuticals 
and indigenous communities in Amazon;150 Merck & Co., Inc. and a Costa Rican 
Biodiversity Research Organization-INBIO151 are best reflective of this approach; and 
provide a guideline for the South African research centers and universities engaging 
in research and development activities. Such contracts provide short- and long- terms 
benefits to persons and communities that allow access and collection of the IBR or the 
genetic resource and share traditional knowledge about their properties.  
In summary, by allowing access to bio-resources and associated TK or use to 
pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies for R&D of new medicinal products and 
treatments, indigenous communities152 may not only increase the value of their bio-
resources153 but reduce genetic erosion through increasing potential for modern crops 
and so enhancing long-term food security; and conservation of biodiversity. This may 
conserve biodiversity, promote sustainability, and have increasing chances of 
reciprocity with companies benefitted from such arrangements.154 However, two 
conditions must hold if the bioprospecting contracts are to be effective in reducing the 
genetic erosion and to promote conservation of biodiversity- i) established rights or 
well-defined ownership over the bio-resources or the TK to grant access; and ii) the 
minimum transaction costs, in particular, the costs of genetic resource must not be 
high for the research-based companies.155 
It has been observed that in many instances of bioprospecting both conditions 
have been found difficult to satisfy by the holders of the bioresources because 
ownership over bioresources and TK associated therewith passes from generation to 
generation and there is no track record or written document available to establish 
                                                 
149 Sec. 84 of the NEMBA, 2004. 
150 Stephen B. Brush, op cit note 7. 
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rights. This has resulted in poor advancement in the bioprospecting collaborations156 
in South Africa.157  
In parallel, there is a perception that many cases of biopiracy are the 
consequence of poor legislation governing the use of bio-resources and TK; a costly 
and time consuming permit system, and identification of the stakeholders.158 For 
instance some companies interested in bioprospecting do not meet the basic 
requirement or submit incomplete documents and then allege that the procedure is 
costly, and time consuming. However, the principal point of consideration is whether 
there are any internationally recognized standards for-  
i) the identification of stakeholders and the establishment of ownership when 
TK passed down from generation to generation and has never been written 
down or made available in any authenticated document or record;  
ii)  assessing the private value of the bio-resources or TK;159  
iii) securing returns from the IPRs resulting from the use of IBRs and 
associated TK to ensure equitable sharing of benefits. 
 
It is well recognized that indigenous groups who contribute knowledge 
concerning medicinal or other properties of the bio-resource which is then 
successfully used for the development of further new innovations (products, drugs or 
treatments) should benefit from the resulting patent rights.160 In South Africa, the 
owner of the land is deemed to be the owner of the bio-resource and the genetic 
resource present in his property and should benefit if the said resource is the base for 
                                                 
156 Soejarto DD et al. ‘Bioprospecting Arrangements: Cooperation Between the North and the South’ 
(2007), Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best 
Practices, MIHR and PIPRA, p1516. 
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the development of a patented product or the process.161 Recognizing the well-settled 
principles of patent law, providing mere access to the bio-resources or sharing 
information about their medicinal properties is a ‘non-inventive’ contribution, while a 
contribution to the conception of the invention is ‘inventive’162 and thus entitles the 
resource provider to a fair share in the form of royalty payments. An attempt to assess 
the price of access may be made following the guidelines under the Nagoya Protocol. 
Such guideline amongst others may include factors such as the scientific capacity of 
the access provider; valuation of the genetic resource and the efforts (such as 
processing, manufacturing, or marketing) involved in transforming the genetic 
diversity into a commercial product, and uniqueness163 of the biodiversity. 
3.3   TERMS AND CONDITIONS IN BIOPROSPECTING CONTRACTS  
Starting from access to biodiversity to the marketing of the product developed, the 
parties have to firstly address some of the very basic issues that are common to 
standard contracts. In particular, the parties must take into account the below issues 
that are specific for bioprospecting contracts: 
(i) Clearly defined property rights and authority to grant access; 
(ii) Mechanism for calculating the transaction costs (valuation of the genetic 
resource and contribution of each party); 
(iii) Mechanism for financial and non-financial benefit-sharing. 
The principal legislation regulating the terms and conditions for the bioprospecting 
permit system in South Africa is the ‘Bioprospecting, Access and Benefit Sharing 
Regulations, 2008’ as amended by the ‘BABS Amendment Regulations, 2015’ 
(hereinafter the BABS Regulations). The BABS Regulations for ABS are devised 
under the NEMBA, 2004 responding to South Africa’s obligation as a contracting 
party to the CBD. ABS rules164 require the securing of bioprospecting permits for 
research and any other activities including export for research involving use of the 
IBR. According to Sec. 81 of the NEMBA and Art. 11(a)-(e) of the BABS 
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Regulations, permit issuance has been made subject to the disclosure of all material 
information relating to the proposed bioprospecting165 to the issuing authority (the 
Minister). Furthermore, any such permit is issued subject to the conditions that: all 
money due to the stakeholders shall be paid into the Bioprospecting Trust Fund; the 
permit-holder shall submit status report of the bioprospecting project on an annual 
basis;166 the permit-holder shall be liable for the costs if an element of 
externalization167 is involved; the permit-holder cannot sell, donate, or transfer the 
IBR or the genetic resource without written consent of the Minister of the Department 
of the Environmental Affairs and Trade (DEAT).168  
The BABS Regulations have prescribed a permit issuance procedure, which is 
a replica of the provision of Art. 6(3) of the Nagoya Protocol. It is simple, quick and 
cost-effective if the requisite information and evidence (BSA, MTA etc.) are supplied 
at the time of permit application. Failure on part of the applicant may, however, result 
in complications and delays. Complaints against delays on the part of authorities may 
be lodged at the appropriate forum.169 Until 2013, 73 applications for bioprospecting 
permits were received by the DEAT.170 These statistics are not encouraging to meet 
the objectives171 set by the NEMBA in line with the CBD.   
  
                                                 
165 (such as detailed project proposal; specific IBRs involved; quantity to be used; and the source or 
country of origin). 
166 Sec. 85 of the NEMBA, 2004; Art. 11(f) of the BABS Regulations, 2008.  
167 (such as impact on environment). 
168 Sec. 81(1) & Sec. 85(1) of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004; Art. 
11 of the Bioprospecting, Access and Benefit Sharing Regulations, 2008. 
169 Sec.88(3)(e) and Sec.94 of the NEMBA read with Article 6(3)(d)&(g) of the Nagoya Protocol. 
170 ‘Access and benefit sharing - ABS: Understanding international and national laws’ (2014), Union 
for Ethical BioTrade, p4.  
171 (ie., conservation of biodiversity, sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising out of their utilization). 
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3.3.1     Prior Informed Consent (PIC) 
Literally, prior informed consent is seeking advance approval from the local or 
indigenous community for the use of their genetic resources and the associated TK.172 
Prior suggests that the ‘approval must come before the access is allowed’.173 
Informed specifies that ‘information is provided how the resource and the TK will be 
used’.174 Consent indicates ‘permission to use the resource or knowledge’.175 
In order to give effect to the provision of Art. 8(j)176 of the CBD and Art. 
6(1)177 & 6(3)(e)178 of the Nagoya Protocol, access to genetic resources for 
bioprospecting activities has, in South Africa, been made subject to the prior informed 
consent of the access providers,179 either of the country of origin of such resources or 
any other member country in the lawful possession of the resources.180 Therefore, 
obtaining PIC of the stakeholders providing access to the IBR, genetic resource or the 
associated TK and requiring to submit it as evidence in support of the application for 
a bioprospecting permit is a pre-requisite, well within the scope of the CBD and the 
Nagoya Protocol. The PIC should specify the time for sample collection, geographical 
area or areas of collection, the sample species or genera of interest, and the conditions 
of transferring samples to third parties.181  
  
                                                 
172 Art. 6 of the Nagoya Protocol, 2010.  
173 Stephen A. Hansen op cit note 122, p1531. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: Subject to its national legislation, 
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the 
holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices. 
177 In the exercise of sovereign rights over natural resources, and subject to domestic access and 
benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory requirements, access to genetic resources for their utilization 
shall be subject to the prior informed consent of the Party providing such resources that is the country 
of origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the 
Convention, unless otherwise determined by that Party. 
178 Provide for the issuance at the time of access of a permit or its equivalent as evidence of the 
decision to grant prior informed consent and of the establishment of mutually agreed terms, and notify 
the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House accordingly; (f) Where applicable, and subject to 
domestic legislation, set out criteria and/or processes for obtaining prior informed consent or approval 
and involvement of indigenous and local communities for access to genetic resources. 
179 (local or indigenous communities with established right to grant access to the IBR). 
180 Sec. 88 of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004; Art. 8(1)(c) of the 
NEMBA Regulations on Bio-Prospecting, Access and Benefit-Sharing, 2008. 
181 Sec. 84 of the NEMBA, 2004; Art. 11-13 of the BABS Regulations, 2008.  
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3.3.2     Benefit-Sharing Agreements (BSAs)  
Another condition that needs to be satisfied for the issuance of bioprospecting permits 
in South Africa is the proof of benefit-sharing agreements.182 Utilization of the bio-
resources for research and development activities183 generating benefits provides the 
basis for benefit sharing. The agreement must be fair and equitable184 to all parties in 
terms of the benefits (monetary and non-monetary)185 arising from the utilization and 
subsequent application and commercialization of the innovative technology based on 
the IBR or the TK associated therewith. For approval, it is critical that the agreement 
makes some provision for enhancing the scientific knowledge and technical capacity 
of the stakeholders to conserve, use, and develop IBRs or any other activity that 
promotes the conservation, sustainable use, and development of the relevant IBR.186  
Under the Nagoya Protocol, the capacity-building/development and 
strengthening of human resources and institutional capacities to effectively implement 
the Protocol is central to all benefits.187 This requires parties to identify their national 
capacity needs and priorities through national capacity self-assessment.188 The key 
areas needing capacity-building identified by the Protocol include implementation of 
the protocol; negotiation of the MATs; development, implementation, enforcement of 
domestic legislation on ABS; and development of endogenous research capabilities to 
add value to their own genetic resources.189 
For incentivizing collaboration, a successful benefit-sharing negotiation is 
described in Figure 1.  
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This graphic summarizes a royalty sharing mechanism in a situation where the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison (UW)190 discovered and characterized a compound 
from the pentadiplandra brazzeana191 plant (South Africa) and successfully applied 
for patent protection192 at the USPTO and EPO.193 A pharmaceutical company- 
NEETOO - then developed and commercialized it. The net gross income received by 
the UW from NEETOO,194 after deduction of out-of-pocket costs, is divided into two 
equal halves. The first half (the common fund) is to be distributed to the collaborating 
institution (the Department of Science and Technology (DST), South Africa), the 
inventors and the UW’s administration, while the remaining half is to flow back to 
                                                 
190 A public research university in Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America. 
191 It is the sole specie in the plant genus Pentadiplandra. Brazzein is 2000 times as sweet as sugar, and 
has low calorific value. 
192 ‘Patents on life: the final assault on the commons’ (2000), GRAINS, p6. 
193 Ibid. (Researchers at the University of Wisconsin have been granted US patents 532658, 5346998, 
5527555, and 5741537, as well as European patent 684995 for a protein isolated from the berry of 
Pentadiplandrabrazzeana).  
194 (the industrial partner or licensee). 
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 Gross income from NEETOO 
 (USD 500,000) 
Less ETH direct cost of  patent filing 
 (USD 20,000) 
(0.5 x $48000 = $245,000)    (0.5 x $48000 = $245,000) 
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 Event: University of  Zurich (ETH) 
discovered and characterized a compound 
from  pentadiplandra brazzeana plant 
from South Africa and got it patented, and a 
pharmaceutical company- NEETOO 
developed it and commercialized. 




local or indigenous communities in South Africa as the country of origin of the 
genetic material of the commercialized product, through the Bioprospecting Trust 
Fund.195 
3.3.3    Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs):  
An MTA needs to be signed by the provider and exporter/recipient,196 if the user of 
the IBR desires to export it to a foreign territory for the purpose of undertaking 
bioprospecting activities. The MTA needs to specify the name of the providers and 
the exporter of the IBR; the type of the IBR involved; the area or source from where 
the IBR is to be collected; the quantity of the IBR to be collected and exported; the 
potential uses of the IBR; and the conditions under which the recipient may transfer 
the IBR or its progeny, to a third party.197  
3.3.4    Mutually Agreed Terms (MATs) 
In terms of Art. 15(7) of the CBD:  
‘Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative, 
or policy measures, as appropriate, […] with the aim of sharing 
in a fair and equitable way the results of research and 
development and the benefits arising from the commercial and 
other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party 
providing such resources. Such sharing shall be upon mutually 
agreed terms.’   
The development of MATs is critical to ensure fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits. In terms of Art. 6(3)(g)198 of the Nagoya Protocol such a development 
requires establishment of clear rules and procedures by the party requiring PIC. 
According to the Bonn Guidelines, legal certainty and clarity as well as minimization 
of transaction costs may be considered as the basic requirement for the development 
of MATs.199 In addition, the following may also be considered as guiding parameters 
in contractual agreements- ‘i) regulating the use of bio-resources; ii) making provision 
                                                 
195 SoeJarto DD op cit note 156. 
196 Sec. 84 of the NEMBA, 2004. 
197 Sec. 84 of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004. 
198 Establish clear rules and procedures for requiring and establishing mutually agreed terms. Such 
terms shall be set out in writing and may include, inter alia: (i) A dispute settlement clause; (ii) Terms 
on benefit-sharing, including in relation to intellectual property rights; (iii) Terms on subsequent third-
party use, if any; and (iv) Terms on changes of intent, where applicable. 
199 Art. 42 of the Bonn Guidelines, 2002. 
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to ensure the continued customary use of the genetic resources and the related 
knowledge; iii) making provision for the use of IP rights including joint research, 
obligations to implement rights on the inventions obtained, and to provide licences by 
common consent; and iv) taking into account the possibility of joint-ownership of 
IPRs depending on the degree of contribution’.200  
An analysis of the NEMBA, 2004 and the ABS Regulations, 2008, reveals that 
no guidelines have been provided for users and providers in developing mechanisms 
and arrangements for ABS based on their PIC and MTA. In order to give effect to the 
provision of Art. 6(3)(g) of the Nagoya Protocol, a clause in the NEMBA establishing 
clear rules and procedure for requiring and establishing MATs is required. Such terms 
may include amongst others: i) a dispute settlement clause; ii) terms on benefit-
sharing, including in relation to IPRs; iii) subsequent third-party-use terms; and iv) 
terms on changes on intent. 
3.3.5    Recommendations for successful bioprospecting activities 
For bioprospecting activities, selecting a suitable partnering country is crucial to avoid 
substantial future conflicts. What is typically required in the partnering country is: the 
existence of distinctive and secluded biological systems, a concrete legal framework, 
adequate political will, non-discriminatory treatment of all access seekers, technical 
experts or institutions to partner with, the ability to assign and clearly define legal 
rights over the genetic resources, and accession to international conventions and 
treaties.201  
In addition, the rights over genetic resources, rights to patent and 
commercialize, and the rights of transfer to third party must be clearly addressed to 
avoid future ownership claims against any commercial discoveries and disputes 
concerning distribution of benefits. Thirdly, drafting a proper confidentiality clause 
appears to be key for establishing a trusted and productive relationship. It must be 
strictly stated that technology transfer is exclusively for the benefit of the bio-resource 
providers or it can be shared between the parties under particular set of circumstances. 
                                                 
200 Art. 43 of the Bonn Guidelines, 2002. 
201 Carl-Gustaf ‘Access and Benefit Sharing: Understanding the Rules for Collection and Use of 
Biological Materials ‘(2007), Handbook on Intellectual Property Management in Health and 
Agricultural Innovation, Vol. 2, PIPRA, p1461-66. 
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This may otherwise affect the collaborators in the context of their own capacity 
building.202  
Another element meriting consideration is whether the agreement should 
contain an exclusivity requirement. Restricting collaborations may reduce 
opportunities for generating funds that could then be utilized for biodiversity 
conservation. Care must, therefore, be taken to avoid the presence of exclusivity 
clauses in these agreements.203  
Based on the experiences of companies frequently engaged in bioprospecting 
collaborations, a successful collaboration also requires consideration of factors such 
as i) efficient and reasonable benefit-sharing negotiations; ii) a speedy bioprospecting 
permit system; and iii) capacity-building.204 
South Africa is- a land with unique and protected habitats, great genetic 
diversity, and a strong legal system. However, as a science and technology lagging 
territory, it requires an efficient and cost-effective system of considering and 
approving bioprospecting permit applications.205 More bioprospecting collaborations 
may lead to increasing viability and resources for South Africa to utilize in the 
conservation of its biodiversity, and enhancing capacity-building.206 It is clear that 
delays in granting bioprospecting permits have resulted in a decrease in 
bioprospecting activities for novel drug screening, development and 
commercialization in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology areas, hampering 
technological developments (such as capacity-building to prepare plant extracts; 
training to use laboratory equipment, training in sample screening and preparation), in 
South Africa.207 
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207 Bhatia P and Chugh A ‘Role of marine bioprospecting contracts in developing access and benefit 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PATENTS AS A TOOL FOR ASSESSING ECONOMIC 
VALUE OF THE GENETIC RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION OF 
BIODIVERSITY 
 
Where modern biotechnology tools208 are increasingly helping the diagnosis of life 
threatening diseases such as cancer and AIDS;209 crop protection, or production of 
industrial chemicals,210 these have also proven to be useful in enhancing the value of 
the genetic resources.211 This chapter sheds light on how patents contribute to the 
assessment of the economic value of genetic resources and, ultimately, in the 
conservation of biodiversity and promotion of sustainability. It supports the 
proposition that for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, investment in 
biodiversity conservation in South Africa is economically feasible. 
4.1 THE ECONOMIC VALIDATION 
The conception to conserve biodiversity seems to be absent in developed economies 
and the principal reason for this is economic: Companies hold that major benefits of 
conservation are benefitted by society and cannot sufficiently be recovered by 
them.212 This imbalance between investment and returns has greatly impacted and 
resulted in failure of many bioprospecting contracts for access and collection, 
scientific research and analysis, and commercialization of the products built on 
genetic resources in South Africa213.  
This situation led pharmaceutical/biotechnology companies to instead 
approach gene banks, botanical gardens, or other collections to continue with their 
research activities.  However, owning to the government agriculture policy214 for 
increasing food production and nutritional security, indigenous communities, 
                                                 
208 Patrick Heffer ‘Biotechnology: a modern tool for food production improvement’ available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y2722e/y2722e1f.htm accessed on 16 August, 2016. 
209 Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. 
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accessed on 26 August, 2016.  
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especially the farmers in South Africa, generally do not have alternative options for 
compensation against the contributions they have made for maintaining the 
biodiversity; letting them to continue with their traditional farming practices.215 
Consequently, the cultivation of traditional plant varieties and the conservation of 
biodiversity are threatened, with negative effects for farmers and landowners. In the 
long run, however, the pharmaceutical/biotechnology companies are also affected 
when they require new genetic resources, not available under ex-situ216 arrangements, 
to continue with new drug discovery and development process. In-situ conservation of 
genetic resources is therefore valued for maintaining genetic diversity, fostering 
innovations, and enhancing economic performance in South Africa.217 
4.2 THE ROLE OF PATENTS 
There is general perception that patents are the legal routes of bio-piracy and 
biodiversity destruction. In support, it is argued that biodiversity research-based 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies attempt to monopolize traditional 
medicines, treatments, or practices by reproducing them synthetically and developing 
them into commercial products.218 Allegations are also made that such companies 
access the IBRs or the genetic resources without authorization, involvement, and prior 
consent219 of the stakeholders.220 Furthermore, it is alleged that physical resources 
(such as traditional plants and plant varieties) are exposed to threats or extinction 
when the scientists use them or export them without obtaining the concerned 
authorities’ approval in the holder-country.221 This debate poses a few essential 
questions: i) whether patents are really destructive to biodiversity or causative to 
genetic erosion; ii) whether and to what extent it is fair to have access to the bio-
resources and knowledge of the other nations and develop them into patented and 
                                                 
215 Stephen B. Brush ‘Genes in the Field: On-farm Conservation of Crop Diversity’ (2000), 
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, IDRC, p138 
216 Ex-situ means ‘off-site conservation’, i.e., protection  arrangement for a specie outside its natural 
habitat. 
217 ‘Patents and innovation: trends and policy challenges’ (2004), Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development,  OECD Publications. 
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commercial products, process, or treatments; iii) whether and to what extent domestic 
patent laws and international agreements/conventions relating to patents and 
biodiversity conservation are supportive to the aforesaid activities of the researchers 
and  scientists; iv) whether bio-prospecting contracts are effective as a conservation 
tools for bio-resources including genetic resources and the traditional knowledge 
associated therewith.222 
4.2.1 Are patents really destructive to biodiversity? 
When considering the issue of biopiracy and biodiversity destruction, it is vital to 
draw a line between resources that are tangible and dividable223 and in some form 
may be the subject of exclusivity (patent rights); and resources that are intangible and 
multipliable (information/knowledge) and ‘as such’ cannot be patentable. A body of 
case law224 suggests that sources, whether tangible (genetic materials) or intangible 
(traditional knowledge), which are publicly diffused, cannot be the subject of patent 
rights.225 This can be deduced from the fact that the WTO’s TRIPS agreement 
requires member states to grant patent rights over innovations that are novel, and non-
obvious to the person skilled-in-the-art.226  
This means that patent rights over products, processes, or uses, which 
constitute a part of the state-of-the-art, are not available under the national and 
international laws and regulations. Indeed, if the end product constitutes a mere 
isolated and purified form of the natural resource product, identical in its structure and 
composition to the original, it can be refused patent protection.227 On the other hand, 
the CBD requires the parties to ensure the patents rights support the CBD’s objectives 
                                                 
222 Stephen B. Brush ‘The Lighthouse and the Potato: Internalizing the Value of Crop Genetic 
Diversity’ (2002), Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), Working paper No. 37, University of 
Massachusetts. 
223 (such as plants, animals, and microorganisms) 
224 In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2009);     
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989);    
Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1984);     
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006);  
Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
225 European Patent Office Opposition Division, 2010 -- Decision revoking the European patent and 
grounds for the decision (Annex) — opposition with respect to patent EP1429795 available at 
register.epoline.org/espacenet/application?number=EP02777223&tab=doclist  accessed on 6 
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226 Art. 27(1) of the TRIPs; Sec. 25(1) of the South African Patent Act 57 of 1978. 
227 Demaine LJ and Fellmeth ‘Reinventing the Double Helix: A novel and non-obvious 
reconceptualization of the Biotechnology patent’ (2002), Stan. L. Rev. 55:303, p303-462. 
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including biodiversity conservation and sustainable-use.228 It further obliges that 
incentive measures (economic and social)229 should be supportive rather than in 
conflict with the CBD’s objectives. This suggests that patents, and access and benefit-
sharing objectives of the CBD constitute a vital component of the biodiversity 
conservation.230 
This can further be substantiated from the fact that the Bonn Guidelines and 
the Nagoya Protocol provide a transparent legal mechanism for effective 
implementation of the CBD’s access and benefit sharing objectives. This assurance is 
a great incentive for enhancing contribution towards conservation of biodiversity and 
sustainable-use of its components in the form of private bioprospecting contracts. 
Such contracts set out the terms and conditions of access-and-benefit sharing with 
required legal certainty, clarity and transparency.  
Patents aim to provide an incentive for investment into new innovations and 
dissemination of technology protected thereunder. But, in parallel, patents have long 
been considered as creating tension between innovations at one end and competition 
in the market and diffusion of technology at the other.231 Though limiting access to 
basic techniques or tools (most recently in BRCA1 and BRCA2232  gene patents)233  
and broader patent protection may hamper further innovations234 and adversely impact 
competition in the market, this impact is more of a policy issue and particular 
conditions rather than patents.235 A carefully designed patent system that is balanced 
in its founding pillars (i.e., the patentable subject matter, patentability criteria and 
patent breadth) may progress innovations, dissemination of technology and economic 
performance.236 This requires actions to be regulated through appropriate legislation 
or rules of law. 
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Recent evolutions in science and technology, encouraged by the public and 
private sectors in various economies including South Africa; changes in patent 
policies after WTO’s TRIPs agreement, CBD and its attendant agreements including 
UPOV and ITPGRFA, an open industrial economy, driven by effective capital 
markets and vigorous competition;237 disclosure of underlying technology in 
exchange for the patent monopoly, technology- which otherwise may remain secret, 
and above all, progress in the economic evaluation of patents (gauged by the size of 
the market for which a patent is issued) have diluted the negative impact of patents on 
innovations and economic performance to a significant extent. The increasing number 
of patents, particularly in biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and chemical sectors, 
reflects the strengthening of patent system in Europe, Japan, China, Korea and 
USA238 and recognition as a tool for enhancing technological innovations. However, 
the concerns shall still be remaining there for probing deeper into the factors resulting 
in poor economic development and transfer of technology in developing countries. 
Nevertheless contrasting the position in the past, recent advances in biotechnology, 
bioinformatics, and software engineering resulting in high level of innovations, are a 
prima facie evidence of the fact that patent system is incentivizing innovations and 
contributing to the conservation of biodiversity, industrial development and economic 
well-being of the people in the developing countries. 
Seen in the above light, patents may thus, in principle, be supportive of the 
CBD’s objective rather than its destruction and decline. In parallel, beyond 
encouraging innovations and fostering dissemination of knowledge, patents with a 
reasonable scope of protection, may generate resources and promote economic 
activities.239This may indirectly contribute to the conservation of biodiversity and 
sustainable-use in developing countries. The NGOs, independent analysts, 
biodiversity conservationists, and communities240 might have noticed in the Neem, 
                                                 
237 Stephen A. Merrill et al. ‘A Patent System for the 21st Century’ (2004), National Academies Press, 
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on Economic Activity, p783-820; 
Wesley M. Cohen et al. ‘Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. 
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)’ (2000), National Bureau of Economic Research, USA, p3-28. 
239 ‘Patents and innovation: trends and policy challenges’ (2004), Organisation for Economic Co-
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Turmeric, Basmati and Hoodia biopiracy instances that- attempts to monopolize IBRs 
and associated knowledge by the research-based companies ultimately had resulted in 
revocation of the patented rights.241 From a legal perspective, the perception that 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies get patent rights over indigenous 
resources and traditional knowledge and exploit them to their own benefits is 
generally incorrect. From the practical side, for any instances of unlawful exploitation 
of IBRs and associated TK, common and substantive laws (such as intellectual 
property laws) protect the rights of the indigenous communities. 
4.2.2 Are national and international laws on patents supportive to monopolize bio-
resources of other nations? 
National as well as international laws on patents and biodiversity support 
access and utilization of IBRs, genetic resources and the TK under a defined 
mechanism.242 However, in reality, the communities in the developing countries are 
self-exploiters and bio-pirates. The poor economic conditions and infrastructure, food 
insecurities, unemployment, and other social needs force them to collect and sell their 
resources directly or indirectly to the research-based companies of the developed 
world at nominal costs. Within such communities, the individual scientists and 
researchers with better living status or employment opportunities take out the 
collectively-owned resources, modify them and export genes/DNA samples for 
further researches under collaborative research programs so to place them in the 
commercial market as their own property rights. 
Patent laws place no restriction on the use of IBRs, genetic resources, or TK 
for the development of new or improved products, processes, or treatments.243 
However, the rights over new or improved innovations in no way extend to the use of 
the IBR, genetic resources, or TK by the local or indigenous community in their 
traditional way. Together with the national law on biodiversity,244 the South African 
Patents Act, 1978 recognizes the rights of the local or indigenous communities over 
                                                                                                                                            
Ghana. International conservation organizations such as WRI (World Resources Institute ) and IUCN 
(International Union for Conservation of Nature), France]. 
241 Sayan Bhattacharya ‘Bioprospecting, biopiracy and food security in India: The emerging sides of 
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242 Art. 15 & Art. 16 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992; Sec. 80-93 of the National 
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004. 
243 Sec. 101 of Title 35 of the Unites States Code. 
244 The National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004 and Bioprospecting, Access and 
Benefit Sharing Regulations, 2008. 
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bio-resources.245 This is done by requiring the patent applicant, who lodges a 
statement with the Registrar that his invention is based on or derived from the IBR, 
genetic resource, TK, or use, to furnish proof of his title or authority to use the 
resource.246 Such proof may comprise the PIC and the existence of agreements on 
material transfer and benefit sharing. Patents built on IBRs or genetic resources 
require the collector of the resources to share the benefits247 as has been mutually 
agreed with the providers of such resources. A portion of such benefits is to be 
deposited to the Trust Fund for use in the conservation of biodiversity.  
Allegations, that patents result in destruction, or depletion of bio-resources, 
may have held true to some extent in the past. In the modern era of technological 
innovations, development of laboratory techniques and research tools has significantly 
curtailed the use of bio-resources especially the plants and laboratory animals. Once a 
compound is isolated or extracted from its natural environment, its use in the 
biological systems (such as bacteria or yeast) is tested for enhanced activity and yield.  
Such systems have significantly reduced the time span for pre-clinical trials. 
Nevertheless, for any adverse situations, the South African National Environmental 
Management Act, 1998 and the NEMBA, 2004 aim to conserve biodiversity and 
protect their habitats. 
In the agriculture sector, cultivation of genetically uniform crop varieties as 
part of the national governments’ policies for increased productivity, food securities 
and farm income might have resulted in loss of biodiversity, or genetic erosion. This 
genetic erosion has also affected the number of patents and ultimately the availability 
of new drugs or treatments in the market.248 It is therefore the national governments’ 
responsibility to revisit their agriculture policies and provide farmers with incentives 
in the form of subsidies such as reimbursement for seeds, fertilizers, equipments and 
labour, to continue growing the traditional plant varieties.  
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4.2.3 To what extent is it fair to have access to bio-resources of other nations 
In pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors, access to bioresources of other nations 
must be made easy without much documentary compliances.249 However, such access 
must be subject to fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from such access.250 
Development in health sectors requires new drugs and treatments to be available in 
the market. Therefore, knowledge or information held by any community about 
medicinal value of specific indigenous plants or genetic resources must be shared or 
exploited in the relevant circle (researchers and scientists) to be tested for its 
prospects of being developed into a new drug or treatment that may improve the lives 
of many within and outside the source country.251 For providers to be in a better 
bargaining position in a bioprospecting contract over the resulting patented 
commercial product, the costs of bargain must not exceed the value of the genetic 
resource.252  
Contrary to the practices prevalent in the past, the source providers must care 
for the non-availability of germplasm of the resource to the ‘free riders’ in the farming 
community and make reasonable efforts for excluding other communities from 
concluding the similar, competitive contracts.253 Access to genetic resources and 
associated knowledge of indigenous communities is also vital for the development of 
the agriculture sector and to address the issues relating to erosion of crop genetic 
resources.254 Such access may provide an incentive for the discovery of new products 
(genes/DNAs) and their uses that may outweigh the disadvantages associated with 
such access. Patents on isolated new genes/DNAs with substantial utility (as 
diagnostic tools, for instance) may provide indigenous communities with increasing 
opportunities for concluding new bioprospecting contracts for benefit sharing, 
including covering price of access. Such contracts are thus effective tools for 
conserving biodiversity as well as genetic resources and knowledge associated 
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The increasing number of patents in pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
sectors255 is reflective of technological advancement256 and economic activity in a 
country awarding patent rights.257 Ultimately the patent is to expire and technology 
transfers to the public providing local manufacturers an opportunity to make use of it 
in the local industry. The U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, 1980 allowing public research 
organizations to own and license the IP, generated by the public research funds, as a 
more recognized and effective channel for technology transfer is an example for the 
developing countries to use the legislation as a model for increasing 
commercialization of inventions and generating greater benefits for their society in 
terms of technology transfer and industrial development.258 To assist in achieving this 
goal, Art. 22 of the Nagoya Protocol requires developing countries to identify their 
national capacity needs and priorities through national capacity self-assessments. 
Technology transfer and infrastructure, and technical capacity to make such 
technology transfer sustainable is among several measures that parties-to-the-Protocol 
are directed to take for capacity-building, capacity development and strengthening of 
human resources and institutional capacities in the developing countries. Scientific 
knowledge, capacity building and infrastructure are therefore the real challenges for 
the developing countries including South Africa to meet, if conservation of 
biodiversity and sustainable use of its component is really a point of concern. South 
African patent policy makers need to devise a scheme for assessing the ability of the 
patent system for incentivizing innovations and progressing technology transfer as 
well as economic evaluation of patents built on IBRs. Until such developments occur, 
NGOs, human rights organizations and generic manufacturers will continue to allege 
that ‘patents’ are a tool for exploiting their resources, creating barriers to technology 
transfer, and were conceived for the benefits of developed nations only.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: BIOPIRACY AND SOUTH AFRICAN LAWS 
Biopiracy is a problem which is specifically associated with the biodiversity-rich but 
technologically-poor developing and least developing economies.259 The problem is 
further amplified by poor legislation and adopting strategies which suit the status and 
economic conditions of the developed nations.260  
This chapter analyzes biopiracy issues with specific reference to South Africa 
and the applicable biodiversity and patent laws. The analysis shall progressively move 
towards pointing out the inadequacies in the government’s efforts to curb biopiracy; 
and will conclude by suggesting amendments to the South African Patent law that 
may better protect the biodiversity and traditional knowledge of the communities.  
5.1 DEFINITION 
The term ‘biopiracy’ has not been defined in the South African laws on biodiversity; 
however, the term ‘bioprospecting’ in relation to indigenous biological resources has 
been defined to mean ‘any research on, or development or application of, indigenous 
biological resources for commercial or industrial exploitation.’261 In light of this 
definition, the term ‘biopiracy’ may be broadly defined as ‘misappropriation or 
unlawful exploitation of IBRs262 such as animals, plants, microbes, or other organisms 
of indigenous species including any derivatives or any genetic materials of such 
animals, plants, microbes, or other organisms on commercial or industrial scale’.  
5.2 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: BIODIVERSITY ACT, 
2004 
In discharge of South Africa’s obligations under the CBD, its attendant agreements, 
and within the framework of the NEMA, the NEMBA was enacted to provide for – 
i) the management and conservation of biodiversity and its components; 
ii) the use of IBRs in a sustainable manner; and 
                                                 
259 Carl-Gustaf Thornström ‘Access and Benefit Sharing: Understanding the Rules for Collection and 
Use of Biological Materials’ (2007), Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural 
Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices, MIHR and PIPRA, p1461; 
Paul Gepts ‘Who Owns Biodiversity, and How Should the Owners Be Compensated?’ (2004), Plant 
Physiol, Vol. 134(4), p1295-1307. 
260 Steffen Bohm et al. ‘Upsetting the offset: The political economy of carbon market’ (2009), 
MayFlyBooks, London, p299. 
261 Sec. 1(1) of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004.  
262 ‘The National Agricultural Directory 2009’ CIPRO, RainbowSA, p496. 
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iii) the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from bioprospecting 
involving IBRs.263 
The NEMBA is based on the CBD negotiated within the United Nations 
Environmental Program (UNEP). In order to prevent biopiracy, Sec. 81(1) of the 
NEMBA makes it incumbent upon the access seekers to secure permit before any 
research involving use of IBRs or TK is conducted. This requisite extends to the 
export of any IBR for the purpose of bioprospecting or any other kind of research.264   
Within the meaning of Sec. 81(2) and 82, before the issuing authority is in a 
position to consider any application for permit, the applicant must follow the 
following procedural steps: 
i) Identify the relevant stakeholders, which may be a person, an organ of 
state or community, providing or giving access to the IBR or TK 
associated therewith;  
ii) Disclose all material information concerning the proposed bioprospecting 
for obtaining the prior consent of the stakeholder for the provision of or 
access to the IBRs, or the knowledge associated therewith;265 
iii) Subject to the prior informed consent of the stakeholder, enter into two 
contracts with the stakeholder, particularly- a) a Material Transfer 
Agreement, which regulates the provision or access to the IBRs; and b) a 
Benefit Sharing Agreement, which provides for the sharing of future 
benefits that may be derived from the relevant bioprospecting.  In order to 
give effect to both agreements, approval by the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism is critical.266 Only if the Minister is satisfied that the 
interests of the stakeholders are duly protected in the contracts, a permit 
for proposed bioprospecting may be issued. Any such permit may or may 
not contain certain conditions imposed by the Minister, or the issuing 
authority. 
An important aspect of the NEMBA is that under Sec. 83 and Sec. 84 
respectively, it requires both the BSA and MTA to specify amongst others- i) the type 
                                                 
263 Preamble of National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004. 
264Sec. 81(1)(b) of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004. 
265 Sec. 82(2)(a) of the NEMBA, 2004. 
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of IBRs to be involved in bioprospecting; ii) the area or source of collection; iii) the 
quantity to be collected; iv) the traditional uses of the IBRs by an indigenous 
community; and v) the present potential uses of the IBRs. The purpose behind such 
disclosure is not only to protect the interests of the stakeholders but the IBR in 
question from the potential risks of endanger or extinction. 
Under the provisions of Sec. 101 of the NEMBA and BABS Regulations, it is 
an offence to undertake any activity, or allow any other person to do, or omit to do 
anything otherwise than the permit was issued for. Most commentators are of the 
opinion that the NEMBA is a well-drafted piece of legislation. It is balanced and 
protects the interests of both the access seekers and the access providers. 267 The 
national biodiversity framework, biodiversity management plans,268 co-ordination and 
alignment of plans, monitoring and research to protect and avoid further extinction of 
the South Africa’s biodiversity are some pivotal developments created by the Act. 
However, it is more than a decade since this legislation came into force but the 
number of reported cases of biopiracy in South Africa is very low.269 Whether low 
numbers are reflective of few instances of biopiracy or whether this suggests that 
local authorities are not interested in keeping a track record of biopiracy-cases to 
bring them to the knowledge of the international community needs clarification. This 
requires in-house assessment of the actual position if the government is serious in 
delivering the benefits of the ABS legislation to the indigenous community.   
On the other hand, no report is available to confirm that known South African 
biodiversity and TK has fully been documented and is now available to major Patent 
Offices270 for screening and/or searching for prior art to prevent monopolization of 
South African biodiversity by pharmaceutical and agricultural companies from the 
developed world. The use of the word ‘may’ in Sec. 56(1) of NEMBA suggests that 
Minister can decide whether or not to publish, in the Government Gazette, a list of 
critically endangered, vulnerable, and even protected species of high conservation 
value or of national importance; however, Sec. 56(2) stipulates statutory obligation to 
                                                 
267 A.F. Myburgh ‘Legal developments in the protection of plant-related traditional knowledge: An 
intellectual property lawyer's perspective of the international and South African legal framework’ 
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268 Sec. 41 of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004. 
269 Sifelani Tsiko ‘Biopiracy highlights in Africa’ (2015), The Southern Times, available at 
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62 
 
review such lists after five years. The said listing was published271 online but its 
periodic review is not carried out as dictated by the Act. 
5.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN PATENTS ACT (ACT 57 OF 1978) 
Biodiversity and patents are interrelated in that a greater genetic diversity is the 
mainstay for patentable technological innovations in pharmaceutical and agricultural 
sectors.  In order to reflect some of the aspects of the NEMBA, the Patents Act of 57 
of 1978 was amended by the Patents Amendment Act, 2005 (Act 20 of 2005). Sec. 
30(3A) & (3B) of the amended Patents Act now requires every applicant for a patent 
to declare on the prescribed Form P-26 whether or not his invention is based on or 
derived from an IBR, genetic resource, or TK. If it is, the applicant may further be 
required to furnish proof of his or her title or authority to make use thereof. Such 
proof may comprise proof of prior informed consent, and proof of agreements on 
material transfer and sharing of benefits. Non-submission of such statement may lead 
to non-acceptance of the patent while a false statement may open the patent liable to 
revocation.  
The requirement under Sec. 30(3A)&30(3B) of the Act, 2005, on the one 
hand, aims to avoid unlawful misappropriation of the IBRs or TK by the research-
based companies while, on the other, strives to promote technological innovations as 
well as secure benefits for the stakeholders from the biodiversity to be used in 
bioprospecting. Irrespective of whether this requirement has merit to achieve the said 
objectives, making filing of Form P-26 also compulsory for non-pharmaceutical and 
non-biotechnological innovations appear overzealous and effectively makes the Patent 
Office a storehouse of papers as under the prevalent practices before the South 
African Patent Office, official documents have rarely been the subject of 
publication.272  
  
                                                 
271 Red List of South African Plants 2015 Online (http://redlist.sanbi.org/). This represents the status of 
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272 Sec. 12  and Sec. 91 of the Patents Act 1978; See also WIPO Handbook on Industrial Property 
Information and Documentation available at 
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5.4 LEGAL LACUNAS IN GOVERNMENT’S EFFORTS TO CURB 
BIOPIRACY 
Under the internationally accepted principles of patent laws, indigenous knowledge 
that already resides in the public domain cannot be protected by patents because it 
does not meet the requirement of ‘novelty’.273 The rule of common heritage also 
supports this conception by stating that ‘genetic resources, whether the resources are 
found in the farmer’s field or gene banks, fall in the public domain’.274 Furthermore, 
based on the rule of worldwide novelty, and to give effect to the provisions of the 
TRIPS agreement, many biodiversity-rich countries have explicitly defined in their 
national patent legislation the ‘state of the art’ and enjoined that this shall comprise 
the ‘traditionally developed or existing knowledge available or in possession of a 
local or indigenous community’.275 The South African Patents Act 1978 has excluded 
certain inventions from the scope of patentable inventions but in contrast to the 
position with other developing-country TRIPS member states, in order to substantiate 
its efforts to curb biopiracy, it has not amended the Patents Act to include TK or 
practices common among the indigenous people or communities in the list of novelty 
destroying prior art. 
While the CBD has no direct impact on patent standards, it has since its 
inception-effected patent laws and practices of its member states in a variety of 
ways.276 The most notable being the requirement to disclose information about the 
place of origin and source of biological material and/or TK in a patent specification 
involving use of IBR, genetic resource, and TK associated therewith. Through the 
2005 amendments in the Patents Act, South Africa has attempted to give effect to the 
provisions of the CBD but that attempt fails to effectively support previous efforts to 
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prevent and limit the loss of biodiversity.277 This may be corroborated by the fact that 
any officially prescribed document (such as application Forms including Form P-26), 
reports by the examiners, and information about granted patents, entered into the 
Register of Patents are not published by the South African Patent Office. More so, in 
exceptional circumstances, the scope of information disclosure remains restricted to 
the concerned parties and relevant authorities (such as the IP tribunal and Courts).278 
Therefore, the requirement under section 30(3A)&(3) of the Patents Act may not be 
taken as information disclosure statement about the use of IBRs. This makes no 
difference in the current and past practices because on publication of the patent 
specification for opposition in the Gazette, a distinction whether an invention is based 
on or derived from an IBR or TK is not provided. It is only an indication of the source 
and/or country of origin of genetic resources and/or the TK in the specification as part 
of the running description that may serve as a constructive notice to the public of the 
applicant’s invention and their freedom-to-operate. In parallel, where a genetic 
resource constitutes an essential component of the claimed invention, and an access to 
that component is critical to satisfy the enable requirement, it is again an indication of 
the source of the IBR or its deposit details279 in the specification that may ensure to 
give access to the genetic resource. Therefore, in strict legal terms, South Africa so far 
has no legal requirement that the source and/or country of origin of the genetic 
resources and/or TK be indicated in the patent specification for inventions based on or 
derived from the IBR or TK. Such requirements are, however, provided in South 
Africa’s Act on Biodiversity (the NEMBA). But again, with the possible imperfection 
of restricting such information among the parties to the agreements on mutual transfer 
and benefit sharing and the bioprospecting permit issuing authority; not for the 
information of general public or indigenous community at large.  
While the Patents Amendment Act 2005 defines the concepts ‘indigenous 
biological resource’, ‘genetic resource’, ‘traditional knowledge’, and ‘traditional use’, 
the concept of ‘source or country of origin of the genetic resource’ has not been 
clarified. In terms of Art. 2 of the CBD, the term ‘country of origin of the genetic 
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resources’ refers to the country, which possesses those genetic resources in in-situ 
conditions. This definition excludes the countries, which are maintaining the same 
IBR or genetic resource in ex-situ conditions.280 Defining the country of origin of the 
IBR, therefore, seems critical for the purposes of biodiversity conservation.   
Another impact of the CBD on the patent standards in South Africa is the 
requirement to submit proof of the applicant’s title or authority (commonly: a permit) 
to make use of the IBR or TK. A permit may be issued subject to an application for 
permit and submission of agreements on material transfer and benefit sharing made 
between the parties (researchers and stakeholders). Technically, prior informed 
consent, including conclusion of agreements on material transfer and benefit sharing 
are issues, which no doubt are related to IBR or genetic resources research and 
development, but do not establish any link with the patent standards. The concept of 
linking the patent’s validity to securing of a permit appears to be in conflict with the 
patent system’s general purpose of granting exclusive rights against disclosure for 
technological innovations, without regard to issues related to another system or law 
(here the Biodiversity Act).  
The patent system requires certain matters or information to be disclosed in 
the specification but these are all for the purposes of practicing the claimed invention. 
For instance, patents for inventions involving use of or concern biological material281 
and which cannot be described in the specification in a manner satisfying the 
sufficiency requirement, a deposit of the biological material in the Genbank (or any 
other appropriate repository) is necessary to establish sufficiency. Member states of 
the Budapest Treaty282 have set it as a pre-condition to provide information in the as-
filed patent specification regarding- i) date of deposit; ii) the name of depositary 
institution; and iii) accession number of the deposit to satisfy the sufficiency (or 
enablement) requirement - a statutory criterion for patentability and not as an attempt 
to resolve issues unrelated to the patent system.  
Given the above, the requirement to secure a permit or PIC of the stakeholder; 
to submit proof of the agreements on material transfer and benefit sharing; and to 
ensure compliance with the rules on access, export, or use of that material before any 
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search is conducted, should not be required for patent applications based on IBR or 
genetic resource. This must be treated and assessed under the laws and regulations 
governing access to genetic resources and benefit sharing for the users of genetic 
resources or TK associated therewith.  
5.5 SUGGESTED MEASURES  
In view of the existing gaps in the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978 read with the 
Patents Amendments Act of 2005, it is suggested here to take the following 
suggestions for amendments into consideration so that the country’s patent system can 
play its role in the conservation of South African biodiversity and promote 
technological innovations:  
5.5.1 Proposed amendment in Sec. 2 (Definition): 
In addition to the definitions of ‘indigenous biological resource’, ‘genetic resource’, 
‘traditional knowledge’ and ‘traditional use’ introduced in the Patents Act of 1978 by 
way of the Patents Amendment Act, 2005, the following definition for ‘country of 
origin of  genetic resources’ as defined in Art. 2 of the CBD, should be included in the 
Patents Act and, in parallel, in the NEMBA: 
‘Country of origin of the genetic resources’ means the country, which possesses those 
genetic resources in in-situ conditions. 
Justification:  
The justification for adding this definition is the proper recognition of the country, 
which is the source of the IBR and genetic diversity. Information about the country of 
origin from the patent specification may in certain situations become critical to 
provide. For instance, when the sample maintained in ex-situ conditions proves to be 
non-viable and access to in-situ resource becomes critical to satisfy the enablement 
requirement. 
5.5.2 Proposed amendment in Sec. 25(4) (Patentable Inventions): 
Insertion of new clause (c) after Sec. 25(4)(b):   





Naturally occurring substances ‘as such’ or if isolated from their natural environment 
are not subject to patent protection for want of ‘non-obviousness’ in almost all 
developed countries of the world.283 For instance, if the invention making use of IBR 
involves mere reproduction of a previously known and identified product, having a 
utility well-known to the indigenous people, by the process of biotechnology or 
chemical synthesis, is obvious/non-inventive and may hence not be patented. 
Notwithstanding the said legal position, the actual controversy in all the 
famous instances of biopiracy284 concerned the synthetic reproduction of the known 
compounds of known utility in a commercially viable form. The very justification 
advanced by the biopirates was that it was ‘new’ and ‘inventive’ to isolate the 
compound from its natural environment and to transform it into a commercial 
product. Such an argument held force when Louis Pasteur285 got US Patent No. 141, 
072 on yeast free from organic germs of disease; however, nowadays, when 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology techniques are routinely applied in laboratories, 
such or similar arguments have been rejected by the various authorities revoking the 
Neem, turmeric and other patents on IBR and genetic resources. Therefore, exclusion 
of the naturally occurring substances of known utility from the scope of patentable 
invention is required in explicit terms to ensure that patents are not available for 
products or materials in the possession of local or indigenous community.  
5.5.3 Proposed amendment in Sec. 25(7) (Patentable Inventions): 
Insertion of new clause (7A) after Sec. 25(7):   
(7A) ‘The state of the art shall further comprise ‘traditionally developed or existing 
knowledge available or in possession of a local or indigenous community’.’ 
Justification: 
Within the meaning of Sec. 25(6) of the Act of 1978, the general qualification for a 
prior disclosure to be anticipatory has been set to be ‘made available to the public’ 
(whether in the republic or elsewhere) by written or oral description, by use or in any 
other way. In this respect, the observation of Lord Hoffmann in Merrell Dow v. 
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Norton286 is referred to that may have impact on the determination of question of TK 
‘made available to the public’: 
This observation suggests that a novelty attack may fail if the prior art 
disclosure is inadequate (i.e., non-enabling), failing to teach or give clear and 
unmistakable direction to enable the person skilled in the art to reproduce/work the 
invention without undue burden or the necessity of making further experiments. If this 
interpretation is to be applied to TK, which has never written down or of which, 
previous disclosure is not proven, difficult questions of law and fact may render the 
TK or traditional practices falling outside the ‘state of the art’. In order to address or 
cater for such situations, the suggested amendment in the Patents Act seems to be of 
enormous value. 
5.5.4 Proposed amendment in Sec. 30 (Form of application for a patent): 
Sec. 30(3A) &  (3B) of the Patents Amendment Act 2005 may be amended as- 
‘(3A) Every An applicant who lodges an application for a patent accompanied by a 
complete specification shall, before acceptance of the application, lodge with the 
registrar a statement in the prescribed manner stating whether or not the invention for 
which protection is claimed which is based on or derived from an indigenous 
biological resource, genetic resource, or traditional knowledge or use: 
(a) which is not available to the public at the date of filing the application; 
(b) which cannot be described in the specification in such a manner as to enable the 
invention performed by a person skilled in the art 
shall no later than the date of filing of the application deposit  in a depository 
institution prescribed by the Minister which is able to furnish a sample of the 
biological material. The specification accompanying the application shall provide 
information as to the name of the depository institution and the accession number of 
the deposit.    
(3B) The registrar shall call upon the applicant to furnish proof in the prescribed 
manner as to his or her title or authority to make use of the indigenous biological 
resource, genetic resource, or of the traditional knowledge or use if an applicant 
lodges a statement that acknowledges that the invention for which protection is 
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claimed is based on or derived from an indigenous biological resource, genetic 
resource, or traditional knowledge or use.’. 
Justification: 
The proposed amendment is based on two reasoning: 
i) Patent deals with all the technological innovations including electrical, 
mechanical, business-related methods or techniques and many more. 
While the requirement to submit a proof of title or authority is strictly 
related to IBRs, genetic resources, or traditional knowledge or use related 
innovations. To extend the requirement to the applicants of non-
pharmaceutical and non-biotechnological innovations is not convincing. 
ii) Patent and the Biodiversity Acts have their own defined working 
boundaries.  Thus to import the requirement to furnish proof of title or 
authority to make use of IBR from another system and to make it a 




CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSION  
This thesis set out to define the role of the patent system in the conservation of 
biodiversity and to show how greater genetic diversity can contribute to the progress 
of technological innovations and the economic activity in developing countries, 
particularly with reference to South Africa.  The thesis analyzed the key provisions of 
various international and national agreements, conventions or legislations concerning 
conservation of biodiversity and access and benefit sharing; and showed how policy 
makers287 can prevent exploitation of indigenous communities’ biodiversity. The 
thesis projects that South African biological resources are an abundant source of 
distinctive genetic systems, making them attractive targets for development and 
discovery of potential drug candidates for human healthcare systems; and new 
genes/DNA for increasing food and nutritional securities in agriculture. The paper 
proposed various changes to the existing patent laws to safeguard increasing 
opportunities for bioprospecting and, in return, conservation of biodiversity and 
sustainability despite the differences in power when negotiating bioprospecting 
contracts and benefit sharing over intellectual property built on the IBRs and the 
associated TK.   
Enormously rich in curative value and increasing food production, genetic/bio-
resources of South Africa and associated knowledge are the source of great economic 
activity. However, lack of necessary infrastructure, financial resources, research tools, 
and capacity to grasp the latest technology, it is difficult for the local researchers and 
pharmaceutical companies to undertake the process of transforming natural products 
into commercial items. Exploitation of IBRs and associated TK for the discovery and 
development of new medicinal products for the benefit of present and future 
generations is critical for the conservation and sustainable use of South African 
biodiversity, and within the objectives of the CBD and its attendant agreements, 
including the Nagoya Protocol.  
Insufficiencies aside, South African biodiversity laws and consequent 
amendments in the Patents Act have introduced a number of measures for protecting 
biodiversity from destruction; however, the real challenge is to have access to the 
advanced scientific knowledge or techniques and capacity-building that may bring 
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economic stability and prosperity in the country. Until this is attained, the South 
African government should, in the health sector, devise a fair and simplified 
mechanism that allows easy and quick access to bio-resources for pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies in order to not unnecessarily delay respective patent 
applications as a result of the current BSA approval and permit required for patent 
protection. This delay creates additional barriers to the exploitation of patented 
technology and, in turn, delays in the utilization of benefits in biodiversity 
conservation. Such access, however, must be limited to those companies that are 
willing to only engage in bioprospecting activities in return for the fair sharing of the 
benefits that are derived from the utilization of the IBRs with the indigenous 
community.  
In the agricultural sector, the real incentive for in-situ conservation is the 
increase in the value of genetic resources that may motivate farmers to continue 
growing the traditional plant varieties for generating a new stream of genetic 
diversity. Making the patent system stronger, both in terms of protection and 
enforcement of patented rights, can help increasing the genetic resources value and 
conservation of biodiversity through generation of monetary and non-monetary 
benefits if use of the IBRs and the associated TK result in the discovery and 
development of some patentable drug targets for human therapeutics or novel 
gene/DNA for increase in plant resistance against pests and drought, for instance. This 
may be accomplished, partly, through introducing further amendments that are more 
protective of the rights of the indigenous communities (a few are suggested as an 
integral part of this thesis), and partly through granting exclusivity over the use of 
genetic resources. In return for granting access, royalty payments and non-monetary 
benefits, including transfer of technology for innovations that are based on or have 
utilized the indigenous genetic resources and the associated knowledge, could prove 
to increase economic activity and the industrial development in the long run.  
Patents on a novel gene/DNA isolated from genetic resource may thus create 
an opportunity for the wide distribution of benefits and flow of revenue among the 
indigenous community, including farmers, and for utilizing part of this return for the 
conservation of biodiversity.  For local generic companies, opportunities arise to, first, 
have access to the underlying patented technology through licensing and, after the 
patent is expired, to utilize the off-patent drug or technology for their own commercial 
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benefits. Local researchers and companies may extend application of this knowledge 
to the isolation of new drug candidates from the newly discovered genetic resources, 
and then use or commercialize this knowledge in more effective ways. If carefully 
strategized, this may open-up new markets or introduce new patented articles in the 
existing product line for those companies who step-in first in the active component 
extraction process. Denying patent rights to gene or gene products, especially those 
isolated from plant genetic resources having markedly different characteristic from 
those outside the particular territories of South Africa, may hinder economic activity 
and innovation development.  
Setting high standards for inventiveness,288 and local exploitation of patented 
technology,289 as required by the Paris Convention, can ensure technology transfer 
and increase in the value of bio-resources. Moreover, TRIPS recognizes import as 
satisfying the local working requirement, but the Paris Convention urges on local 
working of the patented invention and, as such, South Africa can use this local 
working-lever for its industrial growth. In summary, means for providing effective 
patent rights to genetic resources per se are instrumental in preventing bio-piracy in 
bio-resources; however, creating and maintaining, in parallel, a balance between the 
rights and obligations of parties290 is the ultimate way to enhance bioprospecting 
activities and conserve biodiversity in South Africa. 
                           
  
                                                 
288 (particularly obviousness for distinguishing between trivial and non-trivial innovations). 
289 Sec. 57 of the South African Patents Act, 1978. 
290 (who manage genetic resources and those who are interested in their conservation as regulated by 







 Bioprospecting, Access and Benefit Sharing Regulations, 2008 
 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. 
 Patents Act No. 57 of 1978. 
 Patents Amendment Act No. 20 of 2005. 
International 
 Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization, 2002. 
 Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of 
Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, 1977. 
 Cartagena Protocol on biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2000. 
 European Patent Convention, 1973. 
 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 
2001. 
 International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants Convention, 
1991. 
 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing, 2010. 
 Patent Corporation Treaty, 1970. 
 Title 35 of the Unites States Code. 
 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994. 





  Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051, 
1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 Marion Merrell Dow v. Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals, 948 F. Supp. 1050 
(S.D. Fla. 1996). 
 Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 





 Camena Guneratne ‘Genetic Resources, Equity and International Law’ (2012), 
Edward Elgar Publishing, UK 
 Carmen Richerzhagen ‘Protecting Biological Diversity: The Effectiveness of 
Access and Benefit’ (2013), Routledge, UK. 
 Charles Costanza et al. ‘Deal Making in Bioprospecting’  (2007), Intellectual 
Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of 
Best Practices, MIHR and PIPRA, Oxford, UK 
 Christine Frison ‘Plant Genetic Resources and Food Security: stakeholder 
perspectives on the international treat y on plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture’ (2011), FAO, Bioversity International and Earthscan, USA. 
 Dan Leskien ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: 
Options for a Sui Generis System’ (1997), The International Plant Genetic 
Resources Institute (IPGRI), Italy.  
75 
 
 Dennis S. Karjala, ‘Biotechnology Patents and Indigenous Peoples’ (2007), 
Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A 
Handbook of Best Practices, MIHR and PIPRA, Oxford, UK 
 H.J. Silvis ‘Economic viewpoints on ecosystem services’ (2013), WOt 
Rapport, Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ), LEI Wageningen, 
Netherland. 
 James Boyce ‘Natural Assets: Democratizing Ownership of Nature’ (2003), 
Island Press, Washington, USA. 
 Laurence R. Helfer ‘Intellectual property rights in plant varieties 
International legal regimes and policy options for national governments’ 
(2004) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy. 
 Lionel Bentley, Brad Sherman ‘Intellectual Property Law’ (2014), Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, UK. 
 Michel Trommetter ‘Biodiversity and international stakes: A question of 
access’ (2005), GAEL, France. 
 Mpazi Sinjela ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights: Tensions and 
Convergences’ (2007), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, USA 
 Padmashree Gehl Sampath ‘Regulating Bioprospecting: Institutions for Drug 
Research, Access, and Benefit-sharing’, United Nations University Press, 
Tokyo, Japan.  
 Paul van Mele ‘African Seed Enterprises: Sowing the Seeds of Food Security’ 
(2011), CABI, London, UK. 
 Regine Andersen ‘Realising Farmers' Rights to Crop Genetic 
Resources: Success Stories and Best Practices’ (2013), Routledge, UK. 
 Robert B. McKinstry ‘Biodiversity Conservation Handbook: State, Local, and 
Private Protection of Biological Diversity’ [2006], Environmental Law 
Institute, Washington, USA. 
 Robert E. Evenson ‘International Trade and Policies for Genetically Modified 
Products’ (2006), CABI, London, UK. 
76 
 
 Robert J. Lewis ‘Case studies on access and benefit-sharing’ (2006), The 
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), Italy.  
 Santiago Carrizosa ‘Accessing Biodiversity and Sharing the Benefits: Lessons 
from Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2004), IUCN, 
Switzerland. 
 Soejarto DD et al. ‘Bioprospecting Arrangements: Cooperation Between the 
North and the South’ (2007), Intellectual Property Management in Health and 
Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices, MIHR and PIPRA, 
Oxford, UK. 
 Srividhya Ragavan ‘Patent and Trade Disparities in Developing Countries’ 
(2012), Oxford University Press, UK 
 Stephen A. Hansen et al ‘Issues and Options for Traditional Knowledge 
Holders in Protecting Their Intellectual Property’ (2007), Handbook on 
Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation, Vol. 
2, PIPRA, Oxford, UK. 
 Stephen B. Brush ‘Genes in the Field: On-farm Conservation of Crop 
Diversity’ (2000), International Plant Genetic Resources 
Institute, International Development Research Centre (Canada), IDRC, 
Ottawa, Canada.  
 Stephen B. Brush ‘The Lighthouse and the Potato: Internalizing the Value of 
Crop Genetic Diversity’ (2002), Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), 
University of Massachusetts, USA. 
 Stevens AJ ‘Valuation and Licensing in Global Health’ (2007), Intellectual 
Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of 
Best Practices, MIHR and PIPRA, Oxford, UK 
 Susette Biber-Klemm ‘Rights to Plant Genetic Resources and Traditional 





 ‘Contribution of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Principle of 
Prior and Informed Consent’ (2005), United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, New York, USA. 
 ‘Genetic Resources: Assessing Economic Value’ (1993), The National 
Academies Press, USA. 
 ‘Plant Breeders’ Rights Policy’ (2011), Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries, South Africa. 
 ‘Study on understanding the causes of biodiversity loss and the policy 
assessment framework’ European Commission Directorate-General for 
Environment, Report (2009), Ecorys, Netherlands. 
 ‘The Nagoya protocol on access to genetic resources and the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising from their utilization to the convention on 
biological diversity’ (2011), Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity Montreal, Canada. 
 ‘The National Agricultural Directory 2009’ CIPRO, RainbowSA, South 
Africa. 
 ‘Traditional Knowledge & Biopiracy: The Peruvian Maca Root’ (2011), 
Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors, Inc., Peru. 
Journals  
 Adam Andrzejewski ‘Traditional knowledge and patent protection: conflicting 
views on international patent standards’ (2010), PER: Potchefstroomse 
Elektroniese Regsblad 13(4). 
 C. Haris Saslis-Lagoudakis ‘Phylogenies reveal predictive power of traditional 
medicine in bioprospecting’ (2012) PNAS 109(39). 
 Cecilia van Niekerk ‘Indigenous South African Medicinal Plants Part 11: 
Aspalathus linearis (‘Rooibos’)’ (2008) SA Pharmaceutical Journal  
Nov./Dec. 
 Charles Lawson ‘The role of patents in biodiversity conservation’ (2009), 
Nature Biotechnology 27. 
78 
 
 Corinnecluis ‘Bioprospecting: A New Western Blockbuster, After The Gold 
Rush, The Gene Rush’ (2006), The Science Creative Quarterly 8. 
 Cormac Sheridan ‘EPO Neem patent revocation revives biopiracy debate’ 
(2005), Nature Biotechnology 23(5). 
 Coughlin Jr., M. D ‘Using the Merck-INBio Agreement to Clarify the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’ (1994), Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 31 (2). 
 David G.I. Kingston ‘Modern natural products drug discovery and its 
relevance to biodiversity conservation’ (2011) Journal of Natural Products 
74(3). 
 Demaine LJ ‘Reinventing the Double Helix: A novel and non-obvious 
reconceptualization of the Biotechnology patent’ (2002) Stan. L. Rev. 55.  
 Francesco Mauro ‘Traditional knowledge of indigenous and local 
communities: International debate and policy initiatives’ (1999), Ecological 
Applications 10(5). 
 Gordon M. Cragg ‘Natural Products: A Continuing Source of Novel Drug 
Leads’ (2013), Biochimica et biophysica acta 1830(6). 
 Graham Bell ‘Adaptation, extinction and global change’ (2008), Evolutionary 
Applications 1(1). 
 Grethel Aguilar ‘Access to genetic resources and protection of traditional 
knowledge in the territories of indigenous peoples’ (2001) Environmental 
Science & Policy 4. 
 Grose JH ‘Understanding the enormous diversity of bacteriophages: the tailed 
phages that infect the bacterial family Enterobacteriaceae’ (2014) Virology 
Nov. 
 Gupta R. et al ‘Nature's Medicines: Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual 
Property Management. Case Studies from the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), USA’ (2005), Current drug discovery technologies, Dec. 
 James Otieno Odek ‘The Kenya Patent Law: Promoting Local Inventiveness 
or Protecting Foreign Patentees?’ (1994), Journal of African Law 38. 
79 
 
 Kadidal S. ‘Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and 
the Neem Patent Controversy’ (1997), IDEA: The Journal of Law and 
Technology 37. 
 Lucas Laursen ‘Monsanto to face biopiracy charges in India’ (2012) Nature 
Biotechnology 30(1). 
 Naeema Sadaf  ‘Bio-prospecting: Pakistan patent law treats contribution of 
indigenous knowledge as ‘non-inventive’’ (2011), CIPA Journal 40(10). 
 Neil R. Crouch ‘South Africa’s bioprospecting, access and benefit-sharing 
legislation: current realities, future complications, and a proposed alternative’ 
(2008), South African Journal of Science 104. 
 Nick Hanley ‘How should we incentivize private landowners to ‘produce’ 
more biodiversity?’ (2012), Oxf Rev Econ Policy 28 (1).  
 Paul Gepts ‘Who Owns Biodiversity, and How Should the Owners Be 
Compensated?’ (2004), Plant Physiology 134(4). 
 Paul J. Ferraro ‘Direct Payments to Conserve Biodiversity’ (2002), Science’s 
Compass 298. 
 Paul Oldham ‘Biological Diversity in the Patent System’ (2013), PLoS ONE 
8(11). 
 Robert K. Paterson ‘Looking Beyond Intellectual Property in Resolving 
Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples’ (2003), 
11 Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative Law 633. 
 S Sasidharan ‘Extraction, Isolation and Characterization of Bioactive 
Compounds from Plants' Extracts’ (2011), Afr J Tradit Complement Altern 
Med. 8(1). 
 Surendra Kumar ‘Biodiversity Management Open Avenues for 
Bioprospecting’ International Journal of Agriculture and Food Science 
Technology, (2013) IJAFST  4(6). 
 Timo Goeschl ‘Incentivizing ecological destruction? The global joint 
regulation of the conservation and use of genetic resources’ (2005), Indiana 
Law Review 38:619. 
80 
 
 Weiyang Chen ‘Cape aloes—A review of the phytochemistry, pharmacology 
and commercialisation of Aloe ferox’ (2012) El Sevier, Phytochemistry Letters 
5. 
 Whitt LA. ‘Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property & the New Imperial 
Science’ (1998) Okla. City. U. L. Rev. 23:211. 
 Will C. McClatchey ‘Ethnobotany as a Pharmacological Research Tool and 
Recent Developments in CNS-active Natural Products from Ethnobotanical 
Sources’ (2009), Pharmacol Ther. 123(2). 
 
Academic Sources 
 ‘Advice on Flexibilities under the TRIPs Agreement’ World Intellectual 
Property Organization. Last accessed from  http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/legislative_assistance/advice_trips.html on 21 August, 2016. 
 ‘Agriculture and food’ - Green Peace Australia Pacific. Last accessed from  
http://www.greenpeace.org/australia/en/what-we-do/Food/ on 22 June, 2016. 
 ‘Biodiversity & Human Well-being’ GreenFacts. Last accessed from  
http://www.greenfacts.org/en/biodiversity/l-3/6-conserve-biodiversity.htm on 
23 August, 2016. 
 ‘Genetic resources and intellectual property’ World Intellectual Property 
Organization. Last accessed from  http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/genetic/ on 12 
April 2016. 
 ‘Intellectual Property and Traditional medical knowledge’ WIPO Publication. 
Last accessed from  
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/background_briefs-
e-n6-web.pdf on 19 July, 2016.  
 ‘Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our 
Common Future’ UN Documents: Gathering a Body of Global Agreements. 




 Anup Shah ‘Loss of Biodiversity and Extinctions’. Last accessed from  
http://www.globalissues.org/article/171/loss-of-biodiversity-and-extinctions on 
28 April 2016. 
 Bryan Caplan ‘The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics Externalities’. Last 
accessed from  http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Externalities.html on 8 
August, 2016. 
 Foster Laura A ‘Inventing Hoodia: Vulnerabilities and Epistemic Citizenship 
in South Africa’. Last accessed from  
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5qd3z4hr#page-2 on 23 June, 2016. 
 GRAIN ‘TRIPs versus biodiversity: What to do with the 1999 review of 
Article 27.3(b)’. Last accessed from  https://www.grain.org/article/entries/11-
trips-versus-biodiversity-what-to-do-with-the-1999-review-of-article-27-3-b 
on 23 June, 2016. 
 Maharaj VJ ‘Hoodia, a case study at CSIR’. Last accessed from  
http://researchspace.csir.co.za/dspace/handle/10204/2539 on 13 June, 2016. 
 Priya Shetty ‘Integrating modern and traditional medicine: Facts and figures’. 
Last accessed from  http://www.scidev.net/global/author.priya-shetty.html on 
4 July, 2016. 
 Raymond Cooper ‘Africa’s gift to the world’. Last accessed from  
http://www.rsc.org/eic/2015/12/rosy-periwinkle-cancer-vinblastine on 3 May 
2016. 
 Report on the International Patent System: Revised Annex II of document 
SCP/12/3 Rev. 2, WIPO. Last accessed from  
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/scp/en/meetings/session_17/annex_ii/pa
kistan.pdf on 13 May, 2016. 
 Vladimar Tr Hafstein ‘The Politics of Origins: Collective Creation Revisited’. 
Last accessed from  http://muse.jhu.edu/article/171087 on 6 June, 2016. 
 
 
 
